University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1993

Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review
Mary E. Becker

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary E. Becker, "Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review," 64 University of
Colorado Law Review 975 (1993).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CONSERVATIVE FREE SPEECH AND THE
UNEASY CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
MARY BECKER*

The case for binding judicial review' in a democracy is tenuous.
Why should a small elite group of lawyers, who are not politically
accountable, be able to block legislation desired by a majority of
the citizens in a democracy? 2 The relegation of important questions
of high principle to the judiciary tends to degrade democratic
deliberations by removing important matters from legislative and
popular discussion and consideration.' This is the well known countermajoritarian objection to binding judicial review and points to
several distinct problems: the possibility of judicial bias; the risk
that judges may bar needed experimentation; and judicial interference with quality democratic deliberations.
Many legal scholars offer justifications for binding judicial
review to overcome this objection. Two kinds of arguments are
advanced. A number of theorists argue that judicial review is de-
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Jane Larson, Frank Michaelman, Mark Robeck, Elizabeth Scott, Reva Siegel, Kate Silbaugh,
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1. By "binding" I mean a judicial decision on constitutionality that is final and binding
on the legislature, rather than one that sends a statute back to the legislature for reconsideration
in light of a possible constitutional problem. I follow Calabresi's topology in large part.
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscriminationand Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. Ry. 80, 8283 (1991). As noted below, see infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text, I combine his Types
I and II into "binding judicial review" and refer to Type III as "limited judicial review."
2. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: TiE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF PoLrrcs (1962); JAMS B. THAYER, JoHN MARSHALL (1901); Thomas C. Grey,
Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980); Mark
Tushnet, "... And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"--Some Notes on the Supreme Court,
1972 Term, 1974 Wisc. L. Ray. 177; HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAiosurY RULE AND
MINORITY RIoHrs (1943) .
3. See THAYR, supra note 2; BICKEL, supra note 2; Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 661 (1985).
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sirable because judges have the capacity, leisure, and political insulation necessary to make better, more principled, decisions than
the 4majority, protecting minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Others argue that there is no real tension because judicial
review either is democratic-democratic processes ratified the
Constitution'-or can and should be interpreted to further democracy by ensuring that all citizens can participate politically, for
6
example, by being able to engage in political speech.
The arguments supporting binding judicial review in a democracy remain uneasy, particularly in an era in which everyone seems
to agree that judges inevitably decide open issues-and many constitutional cases raise such issues-in light of their experiences,
interests, perceptions, needs, and biases. 7 Judicial decisions may
seem more "principled" than legislative decisions to others like
themselves-mostly elite white male scholars writing on these issues-but may nevertheless reflect the interests and needs of their
class, race, and sex at the expense of the needs and interests of
other, more numerous groups.'
In this literature on the problems with, and justifications for,
binding judicial review in a democracy, one might expect the relatively obvious and unique problem of women to play at least a
significant role. Women are, after all, a majority group excluded
from the process that produced the Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
and binding judicial review. Women have been excluded from the
judiciary throughout most of our history, and the judiciary operates
within a system of precedent. Even were women present today in
the judiciary at appropriate levels, they would be bound by precedent
developed by men.
In this essay, I focus on the uneasy case for binding judicial
review from the perspective of women: a majority group that has
never achieved its share of democratic or judicial power. From the
perspective of women, each of the traditional objections to binding
judicial review gains additional strength. I also discuss an additional
objection to binding judicial review from the perspective of women:
futility. Judicial decisions have the ability to sap the strength of
4. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1980);

see also BICKEL, supra note 2; RONALD DwoRitN, A MATTER OF PaNcn'i.E 33-71 (1985).
5. BRUCE AcKErRmAN, WE THE PEOPI: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. MARTIN SHAPIRo, FREEDoM OF SPEECH: TE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
32 (1966).
7. Brest, supra note 3; Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and
Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985).
8. Brest, supra note 3; Tushnet, supra note 2.
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political movements while lacking the ability to ensure much in the
way of meaningful social change.
In considering whether binding judicial review is conservative,
that is, likely to contribute to the subordination of women, it is
critically important to look at a concrete issue of manageable size.
Analysis. that covers broad areas or that is abstract may miss
important problems or suggest ambiguities that disappear when one
looks at a small area in the real world. I therefore spend some time
looking at the way in which judicial review of regulation of speech
by public universities has operated. This is, I believe, an ideal area
to consider for three reasons. First, it is an area in which all action
is state action, so that the public-private distinction-which tends
to keep matters important for women beyond the scope of judicial
review-does not suggest a neutral reason where there actually is
none. Second, as an academic, I know how academic institutions
operate. I have been on the faculty of one for eleven years. This
is important, because in assessing the effect of binding judicial
review in any particular institutional setting, one might miss key
points if one fails to understand how the institution actually operates. Third, this is a manageable area, narrow enough to be able
to come to firm conclusions.
Examination of judicial review of public university speech regulation confirms my suspicion that binding judicial review is a
problem for women. Although everything important a university
does regulates speech, judges are only able to see regulation when
public universities adopt speech codes protecting racial minorities,
lesbians, gay men, and women. Federal judges are unable to see
regulation of speech when traditional practices and policies, such as
the accepted meaning of rigorous scholarship or the current parameters of various disciplines, impede the access of newcomers to
university communities.
My suspicion-that judicial review may increasingly pose a
problem for women-applies to binding judicial review, that is,
judicial review that binds the legislature and limits absolutely the
options available to it. 9 If my suspicion is right, perhaps judicial
review should be limited. If a court thinks that the legislature has
not sufficiently considered a serious constitutional problem, the
court might strike the statute for the time being, but allow it to
9. I use "binding judicial review" to refer to Calabresi's Type I and Type II cases
involving fundamental rights and suspect classes. Calabresi, supra note 1. As he notes id. at
103, the review is the same in both groups.
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stand if the legislature enacts it again after serious consideration. 0
There are, of course, other western democracies without binding
judicial review. It is not a necessary prerequisite for a free or liberal
society. England has no written constitution and hence no binding
judicial review. France and Sweden have nothing we would recognize
as binding judicial review, though they do have written constitutions.
In Sweden, review is limited to obvious and apparent conflicts
between proposed legislation and the Constitution, and Swedish
judges are reluctant to jump into the political fray. There have been
"only a few unimportant instances of judicial review in Sweden"
under the 1974 Constitution." The French Constitutional Council
has only a very limited form of judicial review. Legislation cannot
be constitutionally challenged after passage or as applied to a
particular situation. Nor can a citizen request judicial review. Only
certain government officials and office holders can, prior to passage,
request review of the constitutionality of the legislation in the
abstract; not as applied. Political scientists see the French Consti2
tutional Court as more a legislative entity than a judicial one.'
On one level, this article is a broad attack on binding federal
judicial review, but it does have three more modest applications.
First, I argue against the extension of binding judicial review to
public-university regulation of speech, an area as yet without a
Supreme Court case. Second, my criticisms of binding judicial review
in speech and sex-equality cases could be turned into arguments for
certain substantive holdings over others in a world with some binding
judicial review. Judges, for example, should be more tolerant of
viewpoint-restrictions which help groups who have less than their
share of political power, particularly when those groups were excluded from the Constitution-making process. In contrast, judges
should be most tolerant of viewpoint restrictions which limit the
speech of groups with more than their share of political power,
particularly when such groups dominated the Constitution-making
process. And judges should defer to sex-based legislative classifications that protect women fulfilling traditional roles, even if such
protection inevitably reinforces traditional stereotypes. Given the
10. Calabresi, supra note 1.
11. Nils Stjernquist, JudicialReview and the Rule of Law: Comparing the United States
and Sweden, in CoMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEw AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 138 (Donald W.
Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992).
12. Alec Stone, Abstract ConstitutionalReview and Policy Making in Western Europe,
in CoMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 41, 47 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal
Tate eds., 1992); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL PoLrIcs IN FRANCE: THE CONSTrruTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATrE PERSPEcCTVE 8-10 (1992).
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ubiquitous problem of judicial bias, experimentation with such approaches may be necessary if we are ever to see equality between
the sexes.
Third, I would like to start a discussion within the feminist
community about the extent to which we should continue to focus
on the Supreme Court and binding judicial review. Should we not
shift our energies to the legislative arena (as we have increasingly
done of late) and perhaps even encourage the Supreme Court to
uphold legislative classifications based on sex and protective of
women in traditional roles in appropriate cases, such as custody at
divorce? "
I am fortunate to write from the perspective of a secondgeneration legal academic within the contemporary women's movement. Members of the first generation- assumed, understandably I
think, that in seeking equality, women should follow the approach
taken by the NAACP and ask judges to ban sex-based distinctions:
discrimination consists of legislative classifications treating similarly
situated women and men differently. 4 Such arguments were, it must
be noted, only partially successful. For example, the Supreme Court
refused to rule that the military could not distinguish between the
sexes.' 5 And it also rejected feminists' arguments that discrimination
on the basis of sex should include pregnancy discrimination and
discrimination in favor of veterans (at least when such discrimination
had the effect of making higher positions in state government an
6
almost exclusively male preserve).'
Second generation feminists see an additional problem with this
formal-equality approach: even when successful, it only helps those
women who are most like men. Women fulfilling traditional roles
are often hurt by it, because traditional protections are likely to
fall. '7 And even if not worse off under this approach, women in
ordinary roles in ordinary homes and businesses are unprotected.
What women need is different from what men need, and hence
unaddressed by an equality approach focused on what men have.
As Catharine MacKinnon noted in the late seventies, the Supreme Court's approach misses the mark on inequality between the
13. See Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992).

14.
v. Reed,
15.
16.
17.

Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 286 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Reed
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See infra text accompanying note 120.
See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
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sexes. The key problem is not that women who are identical to men
are treated differently. Rather, it is that differences between the
sexes (and women are as different from men as men from women)
are repeatedly and systematically turned into advantages for men
and disadvantages for women, so that men end up on the top of
the sexual hierarchy and women at the bottom.18
Real equality between the sexes will require much more than
just treating women-who look and walk and talk like men-like
men. It will require, to be sure, more flexibility in sex roles; all else
being equal, it is desirable to treat people as individuals rather than
assuming that all women act one way or have one set of needs and
all men act another way or have a different set of needs. But it
will also be necessary to increase women's power and share of the
good things of life, reducing women's pain and increasing women's
pleasure. We need, for example, a consent standard for rape that
recognizes and respects women as sexual agents, so that no means
no. 9 We need better social security protection for women, and
better rules at divorce with respect to financial obligations. We need
custody rules that protect women's relationships with their children,
crafted in light of widespread judicial bias in judging mothers
relative to fathers. Some of these needed changes might even require
experimentation with sex-specific legislation.20 And many changes
will require arguments more easily put to legislative bodies, arguments difficult to formulate in terms of the constitutional equality
2
standard. '
In my discussion, I deliberately mix several theoretically distinct
problems: (1) binding judicial review by an elite mostly-male minority in a democracy in which women, a majority group, are
subordinate; (2) binding judicial review of issues arising under our
Constitution, one which does a far better job of meeting the needs
of elite propertied men than of other groups; z2 and (3) the exclusion
18. See CATHARINE A. MACKmNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 116-27 (1979).
19. See SUsAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).

A CASE

20. See Becker, supra note 13.
21. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
22. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights":
A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 453 (1992) (freedom of religion in many ways
secures superior rights to men; free speech guarantees wealthy men access to mass media,
which silences women through exclusion and the promotion of violence; the right to bear
arms allows men to form military organizations in which women may not bear arms-like
the state militias and the national armed services; the Fourth Amendment protects men's
physical security at home from the government, but neither the Fourth Amendment, nor
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of women, a majority group, from the process that produced our
Constitution, our Bill of Rights, and binding judicial review thereof.
These problems are likely inter-related rather than independent, and
the case against binding judicial review becomes strongest when one
considers them together.
I do not mean to suggest that all forms of constitutionalism
(all higher laws) are bad for women nor that all forms of judicial
review (even under our Constitution) are equally troubling from the
perspective of women. For example, the case for judicial review of
denial of the vote to citizens seems a good thing, even under our
flawed Constitution. 2 And, in general, both constitutionalizing and
providing judicial review of questions of governmental structure,
organization, and power might be desirable, such as whether the
government will consist of separate branches or have a parliamentary
form. But even these aspects of our Constitution have a questionable
pedigree, given the exclusion of women from decisions about basic
structure. Women might be better off with a parliamentary system,
since parliamentary governments are generally better at acting than
divided government, and women need action. Women might also
be better off with proportionate representation with party. listscomparative evidence suggests that women do better under such
electoral schemes24-rather than our system of divided government
and one-"man" districts for most elected offices.
My focus in this article is not these larger structural problems,
but rather the special problems of binding judicial review for sex
discrimination and fundamental rights such as speech and abortion,
the areas that seem most relevant to the status of women. Had we
a different higher law-one that women had a full voice in shaping
and that was interpreted by a precedent-bound body only after
women were a majority of members of that body-I would not
raise these objections to binding judicial review (though I might, of
course, have others).
Given the troubling problems with our higher law-such as its
ability to protect best the interests of those most like that small,
exclusionary, propertied group of white men, the founding fatherseven nonbinding judicial review might be illegitimate. It might yet
criminal law adequately protects women from the largest threat to their safety at home:
domestic violence; the right to property protects those who own property (more often men)
and ignores traditional women's work, which is less likely to produce property).
23. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
24. Janet Clark, Getting There: Women in PoliticalOffice, 515 ANNmlS Am. POL. SCl.
Soc'y 63, 74-75 (Janet K. Boles ed., 1991).
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give too much weight to those rights, such as the right to "property," enshrined in the Constitution. Much would depend, however,
on how nonbinding review "works" in practice; whether it would
entrench the vested interests that formed the Constitution or whether
it could be part of a system that increasingly offered the previously
excluded fuller participation.
No constitutional moment will, of course, ever be perfectly
inclusive, allowing all an equal ability to participate and be heard.
This might seem to suggest that any higher law should be regarded
as suspect and probably illegitimate. I do not know; this is not the
issue I am interested in exploring. I focus on a practice, binding
judicial review, that emerged from a document and a process controlled entirely by a minority group-white propertied men-and
having the effect today of contributing to the political ineffectiveness
of a majority group: women. It may be that other higher laws, with
better pedigrees and better substantive provisions, are able to contribute to, rather than retard, full political participation.
I speak only to the legitimacy of binding judicial review at the
federal level in the American experience. Even "binding" judicial
review at the state level would be a quite different, and much more
complex, question. And binding judicial review under a different
constitution (especially one adopted after universal suffrage) and
within a different political culture (perhaps one with a greater stress
on communitarian needs and a lesser stress on rugged individualism)
would be a different kettle of fish altogether 5 .
My discussion focuses on women, not racial minorities or other
outsider groups. There are a number of reasons why binding judicial
review may be much more problematic for women than for racial
minorities. Of all these groups, only women are a majority of the
population, so that democratic processes might have more upside
potential for women than other nondominant groups.
Another difference is that women never faced the equivalent
of Jim Crow legislation. Prior to the Supreme Court's development
of equal protection caselaw for racial classifications, all race-specific
legislation, like that at issue in Brown,/ was designed to and had
the effect of subordinating members of minority races. With sex,
that is not true. Some traditional statutory distinctions between the
25. For example, binding judicial review under the Canadian Constitution, adopted in
1982, has yielded results quite different from those we see in the United States. See, e.g.,
Kathleen E. Mahoney, The ConstitutionalLaw of Equality in Canada, 44 ME. L. R-v. 230

(1992).
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sexes-such as the maternal preference for children of tender years
in divorce custody cases-reflected existing social patterns and, given
those social patterns, protected women's interests. In some senses,
such legislation was (especially when compared to some alternatives)
beneficial in a way without analogy in traditional race-specific legislation, though admittedly tending to perpetuate traditional sex
roles.
A third difference is that women and men are more likely to
live intimately with each other than are people of different races.
As a result, individual women and men may have a greater need
to deny that women continue to face problems in their homes and
in the broader society. Judges, insulated from political and popular
pressure, may be too likely to decide open constitutional cases in a
manner consistent with the need to deny the continuing reality of
inequality between the sexes.
A fourth difference has to do with the need to maintain sexual
difference. We are deeply committed to maintaining difference between the sexes, no matter how artificial. For example, a woman
and man must dress and adorn themselves differently to appear
professional. A man wearing a suit with a skirt, large earrings, a
moderate amount of carefully-applied make up, beautifully coiffed
hair, and two-inch heels could not appear professional, though this
is "the" look for a professional woman. In contrast, we expect
racial minorities to assimilate to dominant white standards of professional dress in the workplace. Judges, insulated from popular
and political pressure, may be too likely to see sexual difference
(which we work so hard to maintain artificially) as present and
relevant (and as justifying inequality).
A fifth difference is that women may tend, more than minorities, to see their problems as personal rather than political. Women
often deny their problems as personal problems, convincing others
and even themselves, that their lives are fine. Anything tending to
dampen women's political struggles may therefore be particularly
dangerous.
A final difference is pragmatic. We might be able to imagine
a world in which the races are equal. We cannot imagine a world
in which the sexes are equal. Without a fair amount of experimentation, how can we know what is likely to foster sexual equality or
what it might look like? In our federal system, the fifty states might
make ideal laboratories for the kind of experimentation we may
need, but the Supreme Court has outlawed important experiments,
such as sex-based custody rules at divorce. It may be that more
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than one approach to sexual equality is possible, though not all
would be consistent with Supreme Court decisions. Why should the
Court be able to close off certain forms of equality just because it
has adopted one particular approach? For this pragmatic reason,
judicial review may be more of a problem in the context of sex.
On the other hand, it may be that racial minorities might also
be better off without binding judicial review. Binding judicial review
of fundamental rights, such as speech, is likely to hurt minorities
as well as women as it develops into a conservative right. 27 And,
just as many feminists have been critical of the Court's approach
to sexual inequality under the Fourteenth Amendment, many critical
race scholars have been critical of the Court's decisions prohibiting
racial classifications, as accomplishing too little while legitimating
the status quo as "equality," thus weakening the political struggle
for real social equality. 2 Perhaps the Supreme Court's conservative
approach to racial equality is becoming a barrier to further progress
in a -world without Jim Crow. 29 The Court certainly seems eager to
deny continuing problems in the relationship between the races as
well as that between the sexes.
Finally, when judges imagine a world in which the races are
equal, they seem to imagine one in which racial differences have
disappeared, one in which other races have been assimilated into
white culture. But true racial equality might be more complicated-

and getting there might be impossible under race-blind rules.3 0 More
27. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Frederick Schauer, The Political
Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 935 (1993); J.M. Balkin, Some
Realism About Pluralism, 1990 Duke L.J. 375. For articles critical of free speech from the
perspective of racial minorities, see, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?,
77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258 (1992); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431.
Derrick Bell makes similar points, but is also critical of political processes. Compare,
e.g., chapter 2 (suggesting inadequacy of judicial approach to racial inequality) with chapter
7 (suggesting that legislatures have little interest in remedying problems seen as AfricanAmerican problems, though they would be willing to spend much to remedy similar problems
in the white population) in DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: TBE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1979). See also DERRECK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL
(1992). Bell might agree, however, that (even racist) political processes would be likely to be
better for African Americans in the long run than looking to the Supreme Court for racial
equality. Despite his criticisms of legislatures as well as the Court, a theme throughout his
books is that the civil rights movement erred in looking to the Supreme Court for real change.
28. Louis Michael .Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
29. See DAVID STRAUSS, STATE ACTION AFTER THE CIVIL RIoHTS ERA (draft) (on file
with author).
30. See, e.g., Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
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than one kind of racial equality might be possible, though the
Supreme Court's approach to racial classifications might eliminate
(or make more difficult) consideration of (or experimentation with)
some forms of racial equality for no good reason. Like women,
who must form coalitions across divisions of class and race to be
effective as a majority group, racial minorities can form coalitions
that can yield even majority numbers (relative to white men). And
binding judicial review can block effective remedies when racial
minorities do attain political power.'
I advance several suspicions, all of which are tentative. One
cannot "prove" that binding judicial review is bad for women
anymore than one can "prove" that it is compatible with a democracy and serves the common good. I only hope to convince
readers of two modest points. First, that in thinking about binding
judicial review and democratic legitimacy, one must consider women.
Second, that the uneasy case for binding judicial review becomes
even uneasier when one does.
Implicit in my analysis is the assertion that women and men
do not always have identical interests and concerns. Indeed, their
legal interests often conflict. For example, women and men have
conflicting interests with respect to the division and enforcement of
property and support obligations and child custody awards at divorce. Women and men have conflicting interests with respect to
the consent standard in rape. Women and men have conflicting
interests with respect to changes in the division of labor within
households and the provision of many of the positive economic
rights important to women as mothers and primary caretakers of
children. Women and men (especially white men) have different and
sometimes conflicting interests with respect to the regulation of
speech, particularly pornography and hate speech. I do not, in this
article, provide a sustained proof of these conflicts. But it is often
hard to admit such conflicts, and I fear that the reader may bog
down on this point. Assume that I might be right in suggesting such
conflicts exist. If I am, how strong is the case for binding judicial
review from the perspective of women?
I have structured my discussion in three sections. In section I,
I discuss the three traditional objections to binding judicial review,

and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. Rsv. 1331 (1988); STRAUSS, supra
note 29.
31. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking minority
set-aside program adopted by a municipality).
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described briefly in the opening paragraph of this article a2 together
with the problem of futility, also described briefly above:33 the
judiciary is not institutionally capable of ensuring comprehensive
social change.
In section II, I consider the two main justifications advanced
by various scholars to overcome the countermajoritarian objection
to judicial review: that judges are more principled decisionmakers
than legislatures or executives and that judicial review serves democratic purposes. I conclude that we cannot complacently assume
that judicial review protects either democracy or principled decisionmaking. More likely, it simply protects the status quo.
In section III, I look in detail at a concrete example of the
conservative nature of judicial review from the perspective of women:
federal judicial review of public university regulation of speech. I
conclude that judges should not exercise binding judicial review in
speech-code cases because judges do not review many similar regulations of speech in university communities, particularly those
likely to harm women and minorities as new entrants. I am not
advocating that public universities ban broadly racist or sexist speech
on the ground that universities broadly regulate speech in other
ways. Nor am I describing or addressing in any way the parameters
of appropriateuniversity speech codes. Rather, I am arguing that
the proper parameters should be determined by universities, without
binding judicial review, just as courts allow public universities to
make decisions about tenure, hiring, course offerings, syllabi, book
selections, grades, and class discussions without such review.
I.

Tim

CASE AGAINST

JuDiciAL REvIEw

In our democracy, the legislative and executive branches consist
of, or are controlled by, people who are elected and accountable
for their actions to the voters. Indeed, the legitimacy of our government is understood as based thereon. Yet federal judges limit
the ability of the majority to govern. Federal judges are not elected,
but appointed for life by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Their interpretations of the Constitution are final
and binding on the other branches of government. Thus, a politically-insulated group often sets final and binding limits on what the
other branches of government-and ultimately, "we the people"can do. In so doing, binding judicial review degrades democratic
32. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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deliberations. This is the heart of the countermajoritarian objection.
In this section, I discuss four major problems implicit or explicit in
the countermajoritarian objection. This is done with a focus on
women, a majority but subordinated group.
A.

Judicial Bias

Several commentators have noted that one objection to binding
judicial review is the problem of judicial bias. Federal judges are
members of a small elite professional class and are overwhelmingly
white men. They are likely to decide open cases in light of their
own experiences, perceptions, needs, and interests and those of other
members of their class.3 Calabresi regards this problem as a reason
to afford binding judicial review only where there is a broad social
consensus on the relevant normative vision." Brest sees systemic

judicial bias in favor of issues and values important to their class
and profession and a "striking insensitivity and indifference to the

poor." 36 Michelman notes that this is equivalent to giving these
7
citizens extra helpings of the franchise.
Although commentators occasionally mention that most federal
judges are elite white men,3" none explores the possibility of resulting
sex bias in any depth. Federal judicial review rests ultimate authority
in the hands of the nine justices of the Supreme Court. Of the 110
justices who have served or serve on the court today, 109 out of
110 (or 99.09090901o) have been men.3 9 Only one of nine (11%) is
now a woman. Furthermore, even if five were now women (reflecting
women's majority status), deference to precedent would give an
overwhelming edge to the men for a considerable time to come.
There are a number of ways in which judicial bias can be a
problem for women. One obvious way is that the all-male Supreme
34. For a discussion of class bias in the 1972 Supreme Court term, see Tushnet, supra
note 2, at 180 ("My argument, in brief, is this: a majority of the Court was willing to invoke
the equal protection clause to invalidate legislation that might harm its friends and neighbors
but unwilling to strike down legislation .that harmed only the poor."). For other discussions
of judicial bias, see Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and
the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1682 (1991); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988).
35. Calabresi, supra note 1.
36. Brest, supra note 3, at 667, 664-70.
37. Frank I. Michelman, On Regulating Practiceswith Theories Drawn From Them: A
case of Justice as Fairness (forthcoming article) (on file with author).
38. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 3, at 664 (although underrepresentation of women is
mentioned at 664 and 669, the discussion concerns evidence of class and professional bias);
ELY, supra note 4, at 58-59 (discussing class and professional bias).
39. GEoFFY STONE ET AL., CoNs-rruTmoNAL LAw lxxvi-lxxxiii (2d ed. 1991). This count
does not include Ruth Bader Ginsburg, whose nomination was announced after this article
was in press.
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Court which developed the discretionary intermediate standard for
sex equality cases in the 1970s had an incentive to pick an approach
that would maximize men's interests (in breaking rigid sex roles that
sometimes hurt men 4 ) without requiring significant change in relationships between the sexes, since real change would often be detrimental to men. The current constitutional standard does, I believe,
4
reflect and serve these needs and ends. '
Judicial bias is often a very subtle, not easily perceived, problem. It need not be that judges hate women or even believe unconsciously that men are innately superior human beings to women.
Bias will occur when judges look at the world from a perspective
held by men more than women. The result of even so-subtle a bias
will be legal rules better adapted to the needs of men than those
of women. Consider, for example, the pregnancy discrimination
cases in the 1970s, in which the Supreme Court (all men) held that
sex discrimination (for both constitutional and Title VII purposes)
does not include pregnancy discrimination: such discrimination is
discrimination between pregnant and non pregnant persons rather
than discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 Or consider custody
standards which give no weight to the work done only or primarily
by women: pregnancy, childbirth, nursing, and emotional caretak43
ing.
An even more subtle form of judicial bias is the Court's primary
commitment to its own legitimacy (or to the perception of its
legitimacy). The Court's concern for its own legitimacy" naturally
results in decisions based on its own needs rather than on a commitment to equality between the sexes. I am fairly certain, for
example, that the Court would be loath to require women to be
treated exactly like men for all military purposes, including draft
and combat, 4 because its action would be seen as illegitimate by
many Americans (though the Court's own approach to sex equality
would seem to require such a result). Yet women can never be
men's political equals while denied full military participation."
40. For examples of the many cases won by men in the 70s, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 117-36.
42. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
43. See Becker, supra note 13.
44. For a discussion, see Justice Souter's discussion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992).
45. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Court unwilling even to require women
to register for the draft).
46. See Becker, supra note 22, at 494-501.
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Given judicial interests conflicting with women's, it is not
surprising that, in considering claims other than sex-discrimination,
such as free speech or religion, the Justices have narrowed their
consideration of what is relevant, excluding harms to women 47 rather
than balancing the First Amendment's requirement of free speech
against the Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to equality. 48 In
this fashion, negative rights that on their face have nothing to do
with gender can serve to perpetuate the second class status of a
majority of the population even if a commitment to equality between
the sexes supposedly exists elsewhere in the Constitution. As Fred
Schauer has noted elsewhere, those most likely to regard the harms
caused by pornography and hate speech as the price of a free society
"are not the ones that pay very much of the price." 49 Indeed, as
other commentators have noted, the commitment to free speech
generally reflects the bias of judges who, as members of a professional elite with an unusually high commitment to civil liberties,
have a greater commitment to free speech in questionable contexts
than does the population as a whole. 0
Although legislators are mostly male and many are no less
biased than judges, they are subject to direct pressure from female
constituents and do not operate within a system bounded by precedent. As women's political power continues to grow, this difference
may become more important. Binding judicial review insulates decisions harmful to women-the commitment to formal equality, the
refusal to consider harms to women in assessing free speech claims,
the perception that sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination
are different things-from correction through women's participation
in and pressure on the legislative process, where women can exercise
significant power in light of their majority status. For example, the
Title VII pregnancy discrimination case was overruled by Congress
(so that sex discrimination in employment includes discrimination
47. American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Penelope Steator, Judicial Indifference to Pornography's Harm: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rv.297 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Comment: The Case of the Missing Amendments:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. Rav. 124 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991) (arguing that core or
speech clause of First Amendment was to protect the popular majority (that would be women
today) from a self-interested Congress); Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment:
Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 119 (1991).
49. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLum. L. RE,. 1321, 1355 (1992).
50. See Brest, supra note 3, at 664-67.
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on the basis of pregnancy), 5 though the Supreme Court recently
affirmed the constitutional case.5 2 As this example also suggests, a
top-down judicially-enforced approach to equality may also be inconsistent with the kind of experimentation necessary if we are ever
to figure out either what equality between the sexes might look like
or how to get there.
B.

Experimentation

In a 1931 dissent to a Supreme Court decision striking state
regulation of the making and selling of ice5 3 Justice Brandeis noted
that there was no longer any consensus that unregulated markets
best serve the economic needs of the people. Further, as the country
faced its most serious depression, the Court could not legitimately
rule out experimentation:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.
We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground
that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in
the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard,
lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.5 4
A pragmatist, like myself, considers it unlikely that human
beings can divine the best solutions to complex issues in the abstract,
using top-down theories, rather than through experimentation. A
related problem is that not all approaches work as judicial standards.
If the best approaches do not work as judicial standards, then
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
52. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
53. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1931) (objection to majority's
decision to strike state regulation of business of making and selling ice).
54. Id. at 311; Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting);
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation,
WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 673 (1980-81); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86
YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
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binding judicial review will preclude them. I expand on both these
points in the discussion that follows.
The need for experimentation is particularly high in an area
like equality between the sexes in which there is no consensus about
what a world with sexual equality would look like let alone agreement on the means to get there. When the Court closes off certain
approaches as unconstitutional, it may make exceedingly difficult
or preclude the development of appropriate solutions. Thus, for
example, it may be that some sex-specific classifications are appropriate in family law matters for a number of reasons, particularly
in the short term." There might also be more than one form of
equality between the sexes, and the differences between various
forms might be important. The Supreme Court, by taking the only
approach it could apparently imagine in the 1970s, may rule out of
bounds certain forms of equality superior to the one it picked.
Perhaps also, different approaches may be appropriate at various
times as well as in various contexts. Perhaps we need "complex
mixtures of approaches," and "fresh mixtures of methods" at
various times.16 A decentralized approach would allow experimentation to see what sorts of rules work best, and work best at various
times as well as various contexts, in seeking equality between the
sexes.
The same point may be made in the context of speech. In a
world in which people are seen as autonomous adults with stable
preferences (the framer's world), speech issues are simpler than in
a world in which we perceive our interdependency and the extent
to which our preferences are influenced by our experiences, including
the speech we hear and have heard. Once the complex nature of
these relationships is perceived even dimly, speech issues become
exceedingly complex. Often, there are speech concerns on all sides
of an issue, as Nagel has noted.5 7 What will work-what will allow
for the appropriate amount of speech, particularly on political issues,
yet give all citizens a chance to develop fully and participate in a
good life-may be far from clear. Judicial review, by limiting
experimentation, may make it impossible to achieve better solutions
than those a majority of the nine individuals on the Court can
imagine.
55. See Becker, supra note 13.
56. GuIDo CALABREsI & PHILP BOBBITT, TRAoIC CHOICES 195 (1978) (discussing tragic
choices rather than equality between the sexes).
57. Robert F. Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CoRiu
L. Rsv. 302, 323-24 (1984).
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The need to experiment suggests that binding judicial review
can keep off the agenda of normal politics solutions that may be
optimal. But binding judicial review interferes with democratic deliberations in far more intrusive and invasive ways.
C. Democratic Deliberations
There are a number of ways in which binding judicial review
can interfere with political movements and impede quality in democratic deliberations. This point is especially important since women
are a majority group; to the extent that binding judicial review is
a barrier to women's successful use of their political power as a
majority group, it is illegitimate. In the discussion that follows, I
note three major problems: legitimizing the status quo; keeping
important controversies off the agenda of ordinary politics while
obscuring their difficulty; and interfering with political movements.
1. Legitimating the status quo.
An ineffective equality standard, such as that arguably adopted
by the Court, can not only improve the situation of men;58 it also
legitimates and stabilizes the status quo, keeping men in control of
what equality between the sexes means without effecting real change.
If the Supreme Court requires equality between the sexes, what
exists must be equality. 9 If women complain thereafter, their whining cannot deserve serious consideration.60
There exists a more insidious form of this problem. We revere
our Constitution. To the extent that injuries to women are someone
else's constitutional right (in the sense that effective remedies are
unconstitutional), women are less likely even to see their injuries as
such or as an appropriate point for political organization and
protest. As Robin West has noted: "The tendency of all subordinated persons toward self-belittlement by trivializing the nature of
their injuries is geometrically enhanced by the self-perception that
their injuries do not exist because their infliction is constitutionally
protected."' l There can be no more effective way to deter effective

political action by a majority group than to turn their injuries into
58. See infra text accompanying notes 117-36.
59. For a similar argument about the effect of Brown and Miranda, see Seidman, supra
note 28; see also PATRICIA J. Wn.IAmS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND Riorrs: DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR

98-130 (1991).

60. See Seidman, supra note 28, at 715 (making a similar point in the context of race).
61. Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. Rv.765 (1992).
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the constitutional rights of others so effectively that the injuries
become invisible as such, though not unfelt. Free speech often
functions in this manner; take, for example, the question of regulation of pornography.
2.

Keeping important controversies off the ordinary
democratic agenda and obscuring their difficulty.

Judicial review removes important issues from the normal agenda
for political debate and gives them to the nine justices on the
Supreme Court. Often, the result is that controversial issues are
obscured. Democratic processes cannot easily work out a new consensus because the question is obscured by the Court or off the
agenda for ordinary democratic resolution. This problem was identified by James Bradley Thayer at the turn of the century, pointing
out how binding judicial review can degrade the quality of democratic deliberations both in legislative bodies and in the broad
political life of the nation:
The legislatures are growing accustomed to [judicial] distrust
and more and more readily inclined to justify it, and to shed the
considerations of constitutional restraints,-certainly as concerning the exact extent of these restrictions, -turning that subject
over to the courts; and what is worse, they insensibly fall into a
habit of assuming that whatever they could constitutionally do
they may do,-as if honor and fair dealing and common honesty
were not relevant to their inquiries....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to [judicial
review], now too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of
the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility. It is
no light thing to do that. 62
Judicial review removes many important questions from democratic
deliberations and debate, thus degrading those processes.
When constitutional issues are regarded as beyond the scope of
ordinary politics, the public is deprived of the opportunity to learn
through discussions about constitutional problems. Indeed, the language of our Supreme Court tends to mask, rather than illuminate,
the complexity of constitutional questions, supporting its own legitimacy by making decisions seem inevitable. This tendency serves to
hide the real issues and their complexity from the public. I give
examples from sex equality and first amendment.
62. TuaYR, supra note 2, at 103-04, 107; see also Nagel, supra note 57, at 324; Brest,
COMOAAER, supra note 3.

supra note 3, at 670-71;
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Under the intermediate standard of constitutional review for
sex discrimination, the Court considers whether or not a sex-specific
classification reflects traditional stereotypes. From reading the rationales of cases, one would think that any distinction reinforcing
stereotypes will fall. But some distinctions reinforcing traditional
stereotypes have in fact survived. 63 The reasoning seems to turn on
the outcome the Justices want to present as legitimate, indeed
inevitable. If the Court is striking the classification, it says the
classification reinforces traditional stereotypes. 61 If it is upholding
the classification, it says the classification is justified by continuing
differences between women and men.65 Often, the Court is free to
take either approach since many traditional stereotypes have continuing validity. For example, mothers continue in the vast majority
of families to be primary caretakers *of children during marriage.
The Court's approach obscures the tension between meeting the
needs of real women today and breaking with traditional patterns
of behavior."6 The Court's tendency to hide this conflict is understandable. The more open the question, and the less inevitable the
Court's decision, the less legitimate the Court's decision is likely to
be perceived to be. But in supporting its own legitimacy, the Court
obscures important issues in the debate over how best to achieve
equality between the sexes.
Robert Nagel has made a similar point in the context of free
speech. The Supreme Court tends to act as though free speech
concerns exist only on one side of a given issue. Thus, in cases with
real indeterminacy and speech concerns on both sides, the Court
obscures the real issue and deprives citizens of the opportunity to
understand the complexity of First Amendment issues. 67 One of
Nagel's examples is the Fairness Doctrine. In the early cases "the
Court emphasized the rights of the viewers rather than those of the
broadcasters, who the Court labeled "mere licensees" so that speech
concerns appeared to favor only the Court's outcome. 6" Again, one
63. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Rostker, 453 U.S. 57; Michael M.,
450 U.S. 464; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
66. See Becker, supra note 13.
67. Nagel, supra note 57, at 323-24. I do not mean to suggest that I disagree with the
approach in these early cases. Rather, my point is that there are usually free speech concerns
on both sides of an issue, but the Court is likely to obscure this reality.
68. Id. at 323.
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imagines that this judicial tendency is based on the need to present
controversial outcomes in open cases as inevitable rather than as
perhaps imperfect resolutions of exceedingly complex questions with
strong competing concerns on both sides of the issue.
Sex equality and free speech concerns overlap, causing additional complexity. For example, the First Amendment tends to keep
off the agenda for public discussion consideration of how, in a
consumerist-visually oriented society, we might fashion a sexuality
less demeaning and better for everyone. Current market forces
emphasize women's status as sexual object valued by physical appearance, and they also emphasize voyeurism-the (male) gaze-as
sexual stimulus rather than sensuality or touch. These approaches
maximize consumption of everything, from beauty products for
women to pornography for men. But these approaches may be
much more frustrating and alienating (for men as well as women)
than a more sensual, physically based, sexuality would be. By
constitutionalizing issues and thus reserving them for federal judges,
the First Amendment may inhibit public discussion of how we might
construct a more enjoyable and less demeaning sexuality.
Perhaps most troubling is the tendency of judicial review, by
taking items off the ordinary political agenda and obscuring their
difficulty, to impede or even preclude the development of a new
consensus through the resolution of the issue in electoral politics.
It seems quite likely that binding judicial review has made it difficult
to work out any new consensus on either abortion or equality
69
between the sexes. I discuss this point in more detail below.
In this subsection, I have noted a number of ways in which
binding judicial review can degrade democratic deliberations by
keeping important issues off the ordinary agenda of democratic
politics and obscuring their difficulty. Ackerman has, however,
suggested that binding judicial review can actually sharpen the
people's focus on important questions, thus improving democratic
deliberations. In discussing the ending of the Lochner era, Ackerman
suggests that even the wrong interpretation of the Constitution under
binding judicial review in light of new needs and understandings of
the nature of the world can serve as an effective focus for political
change in a constitutional moment. 70 Thus, a constitutional decision
seen as outrageous can be good for a democracy because it can
spark a grass roots movement (such as the right-to-life movement
69. See infra text accompanying notes 130-31, 137-46.
70. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YML
L.J. 1013, 1054-57 (1984).
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after Roe v. Wade) to overturn itself. This seems, however, a rather
bizarre justification for judicial review for at least two reasons.
First, it ignores that in sparking a revolution against a decision seen
as illegitimate, the Court may also defuse political support for its
position; consider, again, the effect of Roe v. Wade on the prochoice political movement, discussed below.7' Second, Ackerman's
point seems to be that if the judges err, their error may spark a
constitutional moment, and therefore it is good to allow the Justices
to thwart ordinary democratic processes for decades as pressure for
a constitutional shift occurs. But in the end, what has one accomplished other than wasting energy and resources in trying to reverse
a wrong decision?
3. Interference with political movements.
The most obvious and direct way in which binding judicial
review can interfere with democratic deliberations is by blocking
success when an outsider group does attain enough political power
to enact an effective legal approach given the problems the group
faces. Consider, for example, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,72 in which the Supreme Court struck down a thirty percent
minority contracts target for municipal contracts in a city with a
population fifty percent African American and a record of only
0.67% of prime construction contracts going to minority businesses
73
in recent years.
Although Croson involved race, the affirmative action cases,
to the extent they discourage the most effective affirmative action
(quotas), illustrate this point with respect to both sex and race.
Other examples might occur in the future were women (despite the
Court's interference with their political movement) to insist on better
legal approaches given their needs and the ubiquitous problem of
judicial bias. Women might, for example, decide to pressure state
legislatures for a sex-specific custody standard in light of their
continuing primary responsibility for children in most marriages and
the ineffectiveness of sex-neutral standards to protect their relationships with their children at divorce. 74 The Supreme Court might
71. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
72. 468 U.S. 469 (1989).
73. It may be that public construction contracts are rife with fraud and that this was
a very ineffective way to do anything other than make a very few African-Americans rich.
But the effectiveness of such a remedy should surely be a matter of legislative judgment, not
constitutional moment.
74. See Becker, supra note 13.
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well hold such a statute unconstitutional because it would inevitably
perpetuate traditional stereotypes and sex roles, though the whole
problem arises because those traditions continue in most American
families today. 75
Binding judicial review can impede political movements even
when the Supreme Court does not actually block success. The
relegation of high matters, such as sexual equality, to the courts
saps political movements of their strength, particularly after ineffective victories." At the same time, judicial review can mobilize
the opposition, and the Court itself will be influenced by the
resulting political climate, a climate it has helped create.
When ineffective judicial victories weaken a movement, there
may be less grass-roots pressure for change. Yet, real change in the
relationship between the sexes is unlikely without change at the
grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to transform
intimate relationships.
Judicial victories protecting one or some outsider groups, but
not all such groups, also interfere with the development of effective
coalitions. This may be most harmful to the most vulnerable groups,
such as lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Real or preceived judicial
protection of less marginal groups, such as straight women or racial
minorities, may mean that these groups are less likely to form
effective coalitions with the more marginal groups. Judicial review
is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
In thinking about the effect of binding judicial review on
outsiders' political movements, the appropriate baseline is how these
movements would operate were there no such review. Had women
focused all the time, energy, and money spent in the 1970s on a
direct and single-minded focus on legislatures and legislative reform
(including reform of abortion laws and of sex-specific legislation),
rather than seeking binding judicial review in one form or another,
women might well have ended the decade with more political experience and power. Women would have been different themselves
and would have ended up in different places within important
institutions. Women's consciousness would have been transformed
by their experiences fighting for appropriate reforms. Instead, large
amounts of time, energy, money, and commitment were spent on
75. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding unconstitutional sex-specific alimony
statute because it reinforces traditional stereotypes). For a discussion of the resulting inequities
under gender-neutral approaches that do not adequately protect long-term homemakers, see
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76. Both of these points are made in the context of race by Seidman, supra note 28.
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litigation campaigns and the drive for the ERA in the hope that
male judges, operating within a tradition-bound system, would give
women equality. Women are more likely to achieve real social
equality as a result of a million and one piecemeal 77legislative changes
than as a result of an abstract judicial standard.
The institution of binding judicial review has encouraged women,
a majority group, to rely on mostly-male elite judges for equality
rather than on their own political power, thus draining the strength
from women's political movement for direct political power. This
is dangerous for women. It becomes even more dangerous when
one considers that it is futile to look to judges for much in the way
of real social change, the subject of the next subsection. The
combination of these two problems is exponentially detrimental to
women.
D. Futility (Including Perverse Adaptation)
1. Futility and perverse adaptation: the institutional
limits of courts.
If women do not learn to use their majority political status to
protect their interests, courts can help but little. It is futile to look
to judges for much in the way of significant social change. Judges
can only decide the cases that come before them (many years after
they are filed) and have but limited ability to tinker with complex
institutions. Judges do not have the power to mandate social equality
or to make abortions available to all women in all economic brackets
in all geographic regions. Another example: it is most unlikely that
judges would be willing or able to tinker with the social security
system in the complex ways necessary if homemakers are to be
protected as well as breadwinners are protected. 7 And, of course,
judges operate within a system bound by precedent (tradition), and
tradition is antithetical to change. Indeed, unlike legislative bodies,
adherence to tradition (precedent) is a necessary component of
legitimacy for judicial bodies.
Indeed, judicial decisions mandating equality between the sexes
in radical ways-for example, requiring the full integration of women
throughout the services, including combat 79-would be counterpro77. See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 201.
78. Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, & Tushnet, Constitutional Law, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 501 (1989).
79. Cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that because women need not

be required to serve in combat, they need not be registered for a possible draft).
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ductive. Such a decision would spark enormous resentment and a
powerful backlash. It would likely be reversed, either as a result of
careful judicial appointments or constitutional amendment. Real
change in the status between the sexes is more likely to come as a
result of change from the bottom up, than as the result of a mandate
from on high.
Closely related to the problem of futility is the danger of
perverse adaptation. Social systems can, and often do, adapt to
legal rules without real change, or in ways that are actually perverse
but beyond the scope of the standard articulated by the Court. In
the next subsection, I illustrate this problem with an example based
on the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudenceY'
This problem of futility is the result of the particular individual
rights in our Constitution as well as the practice of binding judicial
review. The Bill of Rights details a number of primarily negative
rights, that is, rights to be free from government interference. Thus,
the First Amendment forbids government interference with religious
beliefs and practices, with peaceful assemblies, and with speech and
the press. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to
be secure in their homes from government interference. The Fifth
Amendment provides for special protection of "property" rights."s
Because each of these rights is only negative (and there are no
positive rights in the Bill of Rights other than the rights to certain
procedural protections in judicial proceedings), they are more valuable to the more powerful. Looking to judges interpreting our
Constitution for equality between the sexes is likely to be particularly
futile because it has the wrong rights from the perspective of women.
Consider, for example, that those who control religions are
more likely to be able to participate in a religion designed to meet
their needs and satisfy their desires without contributing to their
own social subordination. Women, who have been excluded from
leadership in most mainstream religions in the United States (and
who continue to be excluded from leadership in the Catholic and
Mormon Churches), are less able to choose religions molded by the
needs of women. Because they are poorer and have heavier domestic
responsibility than men, women have less leisure and fewer resources
for peaceful assembly. Because women are poorer than men and
because when the media speaks it is overwhelmingly men who speak
(and who speak disproportionately about men or in ways that
80. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
81. To be sure, even these "negative" rights require "affirmative" government action.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLum. L. REv. 873, 888-91 (1987).
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reinforce stereotypes and the primary importance of youth and
physical appearance for women), the rights of free speech and press
are less valuable to women than men. The right of security in the
home free from governmental interference protects best those who
do not need protection from others in the home. Property rights
are most valuable for those whose labor is most likely (unlike
women's reproductive and domestic labor) to translate into traditionally recognized forms of "property." In a very general sense,
the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are conservative; they are
most valuable to the powerful, and often operate in the real world
2
to buttress the power of those who hold them.1
This concern becomes more pointed when one considers the
real world effects of freedom of religion and of the press. As I
have discussed in detail elsewhere, 3 mainstream religions in this
country are deeply sexist. And sexism in religion hurts women
politically. The empirical literature suggests that mainstream Christian religions are barriers to women's effective use of their majority
status to achieve social equality. Regardless of denomination, those
who attend Christian 84 religious services more often are more likely
to take antifeminist positions. This phenomenon is not simply the
result of self selection by autonomous adults, with the more conservative tending to go to church more often. Religion continues to
be successfully passed from parents to children. And women who
have feminist beliefs are likely to have had parents who were Jewish,
atheistic or agnostic.85
Similar points can be made about freedom of speech and of
the press. These rights, as understood today, protect most the speech
of those with the power to speak, particularly those who control
the media.6 These rights protect most those who are presented in
the media as dominant and a majority of the population: white
men. The costs of free speech are born disproportionately by those
82. For a discussion of the points in this paragraph, see generally Becker, supra note
22, at 458-86.
83. Id.
84. I have been unable to find an empirical study disaggregating religious and secular
Jews to determine whether attendance at Jewish religious services has a similar effect.
Numerous studies show that religious Christians are more likely than other Americans to
disagree with feminist points of view. Id.at n.100.
85. Id.at 474.
86. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 27; Balkin, supra note 27. For a discussion of the
early cases suggesting a shift in the understanding of the First Amendment over time, see
Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CoNsT. CotMMErrARY
2102 (1993).
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speak and who are presented in the
society dominated by visual images,
beings evaluated primarily in terms
and attractiveness to men, 7 "free"
keeping women, a majority group,

subordinate. Under capitalism, advertisers (and the media they support) have powerful financial incentives to convey these messages
incessantly, since the woman who sees her physical inadequacy as
of prime importance is most likely to spend money (and time and
energy) in an effort to improve her looks (and will therefore have
less time and energy for politics). She is also likely to blame her
problems on personal inadequacies rather than on an unjust social
and legal order.
Pornography is an extreme example of my point. To the extent
that the First Amendment protects pornographic "speech," 881 it
shields from democratic reform speech which contributes to the
subordinate status of a majority group.
Readers may immediately object that, but for the First Amendment guarantee of free speech, women would likely be worse off,
because government would be free to censor feminist speech. This
is one specific example of a more general justification for judicial
review: that it supports democratic practices by protecting outsider
groups from the tyranny of the "majority." In its more general
form, I will discuss this point in section II of this essay, which
considers the justifications for judicial review in response to the
antimajoritarian difficulty.
The proposition that binding judicial review promotes greater
tolerance of feminist speech would be difficult to prove. A variety
of social factors are likely to be far more important to governmental
tolerance of feminist speech than the presence or absence of such
review in a society. Consider, for example, the fact that feminist
speech has often been treated similarly in the United States and
England, though the latter has no written constitution and hence
no binding judicial review of a free speech clause. Indeed, in recent
years, there has been more censorship of feminist speech in the
United States than England, despite the promise of a written First
Amendment.
87. DOROTHY C. HOu.AND & MARoARET A. ELENHART, EDUCATED IN RoaYCE: WoMEN,
AcsnavEmrNr, AND CoLLEG CULTURE (1990).
88. See American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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Historically, both England and the United States have censored
much feminist speech, even simple information about birth control
(which was regarded as obscene), during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 9 Neither country's government censors private
feminist speech today. In recent years, the United States has, however, censored some feminist speech despite our free speech clause:
doctors receiving certain federal funding could not mention abortion
to a pregnant woman under the Reagan and Bush administrations,
though it was the safest available medical treatment.9° England has
not censored such speech. This comparison suggests that whatever
the source of the unwillingness today for government to censor
feminist speech, it is not necessarily the free speech clause.
Thus far I have talked about the problem of futility in terms
of the limited institutional power of courts, particularly in interpreting our Constitution with its wrong rights from the perspective
of women. I now turn to consider the alternative: the legislature.
Binding judicial review might not be very effective, but the alternative might nonetheless be worse. Would women do even worse
in legislative bodies without binding judicial review?
2.

The institutional limits of legislatures.

Given the problems with binding judicial review, there is most
likely to be a greater upside potential for women in legislative
change without binding judicial review. This will almost certainly
become increasingly important in the future, as women continue to
increase their direct political power. On the other hand, women face
significant problems in legislative bodies, and the downside risk may
also be greater in legislative bodies without the limitations imposed
by binding judicial review. I expand on these points in the remainder
of this subsection.
Two advantages of legislative bodies have already been alluded
to: it is possible to make a broader range of arguments to legislatures
and legislatures can make a greater range of legal changes, particularly if not limited by binding judicial review, because they are
not bound by precedent.
As Robin West has noted, many equality arguments can be
formulated with much greater ease for presentation to legislatures
89. Elizabeth Barrett Browning was censored in the United States (Boston) and England.
Contraceptive information was banned in both countries. ANNE LYON HANT, BANNED BOOKS:
INFORmAL NoTEs ON SomE BOOKS BANNED FOR VARIOUS REASONS AT VARIouS TIAES AND IN
VARIous PLAcEs 49, 63-64, 74-75, 77 (1970).
90. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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than to the courts. For example, it would be easy to argue to a
legislature that equality for women includes protection for marital
rape, though the argument would be difficult to make before the
Supreme Court of the United States. 91 This same point could be
made about countless legal rules that need change in many jurisdictions: child support and maintenance awards should be higher
after divorce; the statute of limitations should toll on tort actions
for damages resulting from sexual abuse as a child until the plaintiff
could reasonably be expected to realize the nature of her injury; no
should mean no in rape, regardless of the defendant's subjective
understanding; and hate crimes should include violence against
women, to name just a few. One could, with much greater ease,
make arguments for these changes in terms of equality for women
before legislatures than before the United States Supreme Court.
Consistent with what one would expect given courts limited
institutional power to effect change, women have achieved many of
their most significant legal changes in fora other than courts. Even
when women could not vote, they were a majority of the population
and were often successful at influencing executive and legislative
bodies. With the exception of the limited protections accorded elite
married women under equitable trust doctrines, married women
gained property rights as a result of legislative, not judicial, change,
before women obtained the vote. 92 Later nineteenth and early twentieth century reform movements, including temperance and workplace protections for women (such as limits on the hours women
could be required to work) also used legislative fora. 93 Early safety
94
nets for widows and some mothers came from legislative bodies.
Although women tried to win the vote in courtrooms, the exceedingly onerous constitutional amendment process proved easier. 9
91. See, e.g., Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45 (1990); see generally Robin West, Progressive
and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. Rav. 641, 717 (1990) (arguing that progressives should make their constitutional arguments to legislatures rather than courts; it is
even easier "to state" such arguments to legislative bodies).
92. Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J.
1359, 1398 (1983); MARYLYNx SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY INEARLY AMERICA
81-86, 97-100 (1986).
93. See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMEN's RIGHTS MovEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 208-21 (rev. ed. 1975); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MoTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).

94. SKOCPOL, supra note 93.
95. See FLEXNER, supra note 93; Sandy Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination
Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Case for Equal Treatment (forthcoming article) (on
file with author).

1004

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Many post-suffrage legal changes important to women were
also the result of legislative change. Reforms aimed at violence
against women, such as changes in consent standards in rape, rape
shield statutes, and regulations of pornography, have tended to
come from legislative fora. Indeed, changes of consent standards
have been relatively ineffective because of narrow judicial interpretations." And courts have consistently struck statutes providing
broad remedies for pornography. 9
More recent improvements in safety nets especially important
to women as caretakers of children have also come from legislative
bodies. Although courts have considered, for example, whether there
might be a constitutional right to an equitably-funded education,
such cases have failed because the rights in the federal Constitution
are primarily negative. 9 Social security, medicare, medicaid, food
stamps, programs for improving medical care and nutrition of
pregnant women and young children, are all the result of legislation.
Improvements in recent years in child support standards and
child support enforcement mechanisms have both been the result of
legislation designed to increase the shockingly low levels of support
ordered and enforced under rules developed by (and for) mostlymale judges. As a result of judicial decisions about enforcement of
support orders, child support has traditionally been at the option
of the father because courts regarded support orders as unenforceable per se. An order could be enforced only to the extent support
was past due, and the larger the amount past due, the more likely
the judge would decline enforcement of the entire past-due amount
as too onerous. Thus, women trying to raise children on women's
wages without support were required repeatedly to hire lawyers to
enforce only small amounts of past due support, with the predictable
result that not much support was collected unless fathers voluntarily
paid. 99 Congress has greatly improved the situation by making support prospectively enforceable through wage withholding in more
and more instances.100

96. See ESTRICH, supra note 19.
97. See, e.g., American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).
98. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding constitutional
funding of schools through local property taxes). Some rights-such as property-do involve
affirmative governmental protection. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 81, at 888-91.
99. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF Dommsnc RELAONS IN THE
UNTED STATES

734-35 (2d ed. 1988).

100. Id. at 734-43.
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Consider also the cases from the seventies holding sex discrimination not to include pregnancy discrimination. It has been easier
to correct the statutory than the constitutional decision.' 0' These are
two powerful illustrations of how much better women often do
when legislative bodies can correct judicial decisions.
Thus far I have discussed two major advantages of seeking
change in legislatures unconstrained by binding judicial review: the
broader range of arguments one can make before legislatures and
the broader range of legal changes legislatures can make. These
must be assessed in light of women's majority status and political
power today. Although in the past women tended to be less likely
to vote than men, women are now the majority of voters and tend
to vote somewhat differently from men, giving women significant
political leverage. Women are already present in state legislative
bodies at significantly higher proportions than in the federal judiciary. 1° And empirical studies of legislators reveal that women are
more likely, across ideology and party affiliation, to support legislation important to women.103 Although there might be more women
on the Supreme Court, proportionately, than in many state legislatures, the women on the Court would continue to be bound by
man-made precedent. Women's political representation and power
will also continue to grow, and women in legislatures will not be
constrained by precedent and existing legal rules as women on the
bench will be.
Women do, however, face certain risks in throwing questions
to legislative bodies without binding judicial review. Legislatures
have often enacted laws harmful to women, such as the nineteenth
century bans on abortion' °4 and even the dissemination of birth101. One recent study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions
in the period 1969-1990 reports that 38% were conservative whereas only 20% were liberal.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
102. In 1993, 20.4% of the 7424 state legislators in the United States are women. Center
for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers University; 10.9% of the 1993 Federal Judiciary
is female. Alliance for Justice. In 1993, women hold 9.9% of the seats in the U.S. Congress,
Center for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers University.
103. DEBRA L. DOBSON & SUSAN J. CARROL, RESHAPING Tm AGENDA: WOMEN IN STATE
LEOISLATURES (Center for the American Woman and Politics, 1991); Susan Welch & Sue
Thomas, Do Women in Public Office Make a Difference?, in GENDER AND POUCYMAKINO:
STUDIES OF WOMEN IN OFFICE

(Center for the American Woman and Politics, 1991); Rita

Mae Kelly et al., Female Public Officials: A Different Voice?, 515

ANNALS

AM. AcAD. 77

(1991).
104. By 1900, every state had laws banning abortions, and many imposed criminal
sanctions. KIuSTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLIrICS OF MOTHERHOOD

15 (1984). See also
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control information (the latter was regarded as obscene), 0 5 statutes
requiring corroboration for rape and utmost resistance.'0 s Some
protectionist legislation hurt many women: for example, laws keeping women from working in factories at night.1 °7 Many state statutes
limited women's participation on juries.1 8 Sex was added to Title
VII's ban on employment discrimination as an accident. And it was
the courts (not the executive) that first showed any interest in
enforcing the ban. °9
Further, women face numerous obstacles to effective use of
their political power within legislative bodies." 0 Even today, legislatures are old boys' clubs reluctant to cede power to women.
Women are often regarded in stereotypical ways (sometimes helpful,
sometimes not) by voters and politicians. Women seem to have
difficulty raising early (seed) money and getting early support from
within their own party. Women are often assigned to committees
seen as appropriate for their sex. Voters do not always seem willing
to vote for a woman, particularly for high office."'
Finally, courts have often reached decisions favorable to women
without legislative direction. For example, as suggested earlier, courts
of equity used trust law to give elite women control over property

from an early date, far earlier than the Married Women's Property

Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion, 49 GEO. L.J. 395, 447-520 (1961). In 1873, Congress
passed the Comstock Act, which made sending contraceptives or information about them
through the mail illegal. Many states passed "little Comstock laws," banning contraceptive
information and limiting the sale of contraception. IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAW GOVERNING
ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND STERILIZATION (1988).
105. David Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions
of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992).
106. See Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61
VA. L. REv. 1500, 1529-33 (1975). State statutes also required "utmost resistance" from the
victim. Id. at 1509.
107. JUDITH BAER, Tam CHAINS OF PROTECTION: Tan JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN's
LABOR LEGISLATION

(1978).

108. By World War II, 21 states still prohibited women jurors. Note, Beyond Batson:
Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920 (1992). Other
states automatically excluded women from jury-selection lists unless they requested otherwise.
See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
109. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
110. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 22 (discussing political obstacles related to rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights); Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL FORUM 169 (discussing political obstacles related to heterosexuality);
Becker, supra note 78 (discussing political problems but also noting problems with abstract
judicially-imposed equality).
111. On problems women face in electoral politics, see generally Clark, supra note 24,
at 63, 74-75; SUSAN J. CARROLL, WOMEN As CANDI1ATES IN AMBRICAN POLITICS (1987).
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Rights legislation." 2 Or consider the nineteenth century change in
custody standards at divorce or separation: judges as well as legislators were involved in the shift from absolute paternal custody
3
rights to a maternal preference for children of "tender years.")"
It is also true that as a result of judicial decisions, some
constitutional limits have been imposed on certain procedures or
requirements for safety nets. " 4 These limits are, however, much less
important than are benefit levels, and the Supreme Court has refused
to find general restrictions on benefit levels unconstitutional."' Further, procedural requirements without meaningful substantive rights
can result in much wasteful and expensive "process" without necessarily adequate protection of the rights represented in the process.
For example, in Cook County Juvenile Court, many lawyers stand
up for each case, but neither mothers nor children, almost all of
whom are poor and African American or Hispanic (troubled white
families do not end up in Cook County Juvenile Court) are adequately represented by anyone, though the county "provides" over6
worked lawyers for both mothers and children."
To be sure, some of the judicial decisions on equality and
fundamental rights in the seventies and eighties helped women. It
is to those "good" decisions that I turn next.
E.

The "Good" Cases

Two sets of cases are commonly seen as especially favorable
for women: the equality cases, in which the Supreme Court held
that some sex-specific distinctions violate the Constitution's equality
provision and abortion decisions, in which the court held that some
restrictions on abortion violate the Constitution's privacy principal.
I discuss these cases briefly in this section, pointing out that binding
judicial review even in these areas may have done more harm than
112. See supra text accompanying note 92.
113. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); J.BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE § 544 (4th ed. 1864).
114. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement
for welfare benefits unconstitutional interference with right to travel); Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (similar requirement for nonemergency medical care;
similar result).
115. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland lid of $250 per
month on welfare benefits regardless of family size or need).
116. Bernardine Dohrn, Work in Progress Presentation to Chicago Area Feminist Colloquium (Jan. 26, 1993).
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good, though we cannot, of course, be sure. In any event, given
the Court's interference with abortion politics over a twenty year
period, I am not arguing for the reversal of Roe v. Wade today.
By its entry, the Court has changed the political landscape and
disengagement twenty years later cannot turn back the clock.
1.

The equality cases.

Beginning with Reed v. Reed in 1971, the Supreme Court struck
as unconstitutional some, but not all, legislative classifications distinguishing between women and men. Under the formal-equality
standard used by the Court in these cases, a standard which gives
a fair amount of discretion to the Justices themselves, the Supreme
Court has struck a number of trivial discriminations as unconstitutional while allowing important discriminations to stand. Many
of the victories were actually victories for men. And some of the
decisions have hurt women, particularly in the area of family law.
This combination of results suggests all of the problems outlined
above, particularly futility. Let me give examples of each point.
The trivial victories for women include cases such as Reed v.
Reed, the initial 1971 case in which the Supreme Court struck a
state statute giving men a preference as executors of estates of
deceased relatives. The case is trivial in the sense that this distinction
has never been an important component of the systemic subordination of women. Reed v. Reed was followed, to be sure, by sexneutral revisions to state and federal codes, and these revisions were
often of great importance." 7 But some of the changes-particularly
the elimination of sex-specific rules in family law-hurt women
(perverse adaptation). Most, if not all, of the other changes were
probably trivial in the sense that the sex-specific rules were archaic
and would have fallen soon even absent binding judicial review.
Indeed, had Reed v. Reed been reached under limited judicial
review, the statute would have been struck as constitutionally suspect
because probably archaic. Legislatures could then have considered
which sex-specific rules to keep and which to let die. Given the
continuing need for sex-specific rules in family law, discussed below,
this result might well have been far better for women than Reed v.
Reed under binding judicial review. Indeed, in the end, most sexspecific statutes were eliminated by legislative commissions at the
state and federal level rather than through case-by-case litigation.
117. Wendy W. Williams, Notes From A First Generation, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL FoRuM
99, 111.
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Even without Reed v. Reed, these commissions would almost certainly have been formed during the seventies to revise archaic sexspecific laws.
The important (and harmful) distinctions allowed to stand by
the Supreme Court include distinctions between pregnant and nonpregnant persons,"18 veterans' preferences for state employment
(making it possible to keep women almost exclusively in the lower
rungs of state power structures)," 9 and between women and men
for purposes of draft registration (the combination of these last two
is especially maddening).' 20 The victories for men include the right
2
of a man eighteen to twenty years of age to buy 3.2 percent beer '
and the right of a widower to the social security benefits available
to a widow. l" Thus, the equality cases support the suspicion that
it is futile to look to the courts for much in the way of real changes:
the cases are, for the most part, trivial victories for women, victories
for men, or important losses for women.
In a set of cases often detrimental to ordinary women, the
courts have applied formal equality notions in family law contexts,
without any consideration of whether the results would leave women
and children poorer and more vulnerable after divorce than they
had been. The result has been perverse adaptation: Supreme Court
cases intended to advance women towards equality actually turn out
to be ineffective or even bad for women. This should not be a
surprising result of binding judicial review given the institutional
limits of the courts. Social systems often adapt to legal rules without
real change, or in ways that are actually perverse but beyond the
scope of the standard articulated by the Court.
For example, in a case in the late seventies, Orr v. Orr,-3 the
Supreme Court struck a sex-specific alimony statute as a violation
of the equality provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. States are
free, under Orr, to adopt gender-neutral rules that adequately protect
homemakers, particularly long-term homemakers, but have not tended
to do so. Instead, long term alimony has become increasingly rare
24
under modern, gender-neutral rules, leaving women worse off.'
State actors allocating resources at divorce accepted the notion that
118. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).

119. Feeney v. Personnel Admin., 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
120. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
121. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
122. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
123. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).

124. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of
Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721 (1993).
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women were equal in a perverse way: as the equals of men, women
can jolly well earn their own way after divorce. Equality is embraced
to free men from financial obligations after divorce but not to
achieve greater economic equality between women and men after
divorce. In general, equality in family law contexts has meant the
elimination of important protections for women and children without the development of equally effective sex-neutral laws, and has
hurt many women (and children), especially ordinary, non-elite
women. 125 Thus, perverse adaptations to equality decisions by the
Supreme Court can result in little real change or even in increased
inequality.
These cases also illustrate that women are likely to do better
when legislative bodies can correct errors because the issues are
within the scope of ordinary democratic deliberations. If a step is
taken in the wrong direction, women are likely to have an easier
time correcting it when legislative correction is possible. Recall the
26
pregnancy discrimination cases in the seventies, mentioned above,
holding that for both constitutional and Title VII purposes, sex
discrimination did not include pregnancy discrimination. Congress,
as a result of pressure from women changed Title VII. 127 The
constitutional holding was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court
in a decision holding that a civil rights statute did not protect
abortion clinics and women in need of abortions from harassment
and coercion from right-to-life advocates.1 21 It is of course true that
sometimes, in some situations, for some reason the courts may be
more committed to change (or committed sooner) than the legislature. For example, sex was initially added to Title VII as a floor
amendment its sponsor hoped would defeat the Bill. Its passage was
accidental in a sense. 129 Much of the initial impetus for giving the
ban on sex discrimination spine real meaning came from the courts,
including the Supreme Court. 30 It is nevertheless true that a Supreme
Court constitutional mistake is harder to erase than a legislative
blunder. Women are a majority of voters, and as such unconstrained
by precedent apart from binding judicial review.
125. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991).

126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra text accompanying note 42, 51-52.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
See FLORA DAVIS, MOVINO THE MoUNTAiN: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

SINCE 1960, at 38-45 (1991).

130. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1970). The EEOC was not
initially interested. See DAVIS, supra note 129, at 45-47.
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Part of the problem with the Supreme Court's decisions, in
terms of interference with women's political effectiveness, is that it
is now more difficult-because of what the Supreme Court itself
has done-to get important issues, such as the possibility of a
continuing need for some sex-specific family law rules, on the
ordinary democratic agenda. The Supreme Court has interfered with,
degraded, ordinary democratic deliberations by contributing to the
common perception that sex-neutral approaches are crucial to, indeed the definition of, equality between the sexes. The Supreme
Court itself has thereby impeded women's ability as a political force
to get important issues even on the agenda of ordinary politics.
By keeping how best to approach equality between the sexes
off the agenda of ordinary political deliberations, the Supreme Court
has also impeded the debate and experimentation necessary for
movement towards a new consensus on this important issue. Often,
it is the experience of the polity in resolving an important and
contested issue through democratic processes, that helps create a
new consensus. To the extent equality between the sexes is seen as
either reserved primarily for the Supreme Court or equivalent to
what the Supreme Court has held it means, the Court's decisions
block the experiences necessary to develop any new shared understanding of what it might mean.
It is true that my objections to binding judicial review of sexbased classifications are in part based on my objections to the
Court's standard. But, even given the Court's standard, criticallyimportant decisions came out wrong in the eyes of those feminists
who advocated that standard. For example, the feminists who supported in general the Court's equality approach argued against its
outcomes in three important cases: Rostker, 3' Feeney,3 2 and Geduldig113 And, as argued above in discussing the pragmatic objection
to judicial review, to some extent my dissatisfaction with the standard developed by the Court as a matter of binding constitutional
law is precisely the point. There is no consensus on the meaning of
sex discrimination. We cannot imagine a world with perfect equality
between the sexes. Nor is there any consensus about what it would
look like or how to get there. Judges, inevitably, are making into
binding constitutional rules their own current opinions on this com-

131. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
132. Feeney v. Personnel Admin., 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
133. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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plex question. In doing so, they may foreclose the experimentation
that may be necessary if we are to change the distribution of power
between the sexes.'3
Finally, these sex equality cases illustrate that it is futile to look
35
to abstract legal rules enforced by judges to effect social change.
Concrete legislative tinkering is often necessary. For example, courts
implementing abstract equality notions have not, and are not likely
to, make the kind of changes needed if social security is to afford
homemakers the same level of protection against poverty in old age
as enjoyed by wage workers. 36 Legislative change is necessary, but
women's legislative experience and power have been limited by
reliance on the Court to achieve equality.
2.

The abortion cases.

Roe v. Wade seems the most unambiguous example of a Supreme Court decision (utilizing binding judicial review) that has
been good for women. Perhaps this perception is correct, and
alternatives would have been worse. In this subsection, however, I
suggest that even the abortion cases were not cost-free. Perhaps the
costs outweighed the gain (or would have if Bush had been reelected,
a risk certainly unforseeable at the time Roe v. Wade was decided).
Judicial resolution of a controversial issues can not only sap a
political movement for change of its strength, but can also mobilize
the opposition with the Court itself susceptible to pressure in the
subsequent political climate. I am not questioning the importance
of choice to women, but rather the utility of resolving the issue in
the courts. Although the right to a legal abortion does contribute
to women's sexual availability to men, making it easier for men to
pressure women to have unwanted abortions as well as unwanted
heterosexual intercourse, 1 the alternative is not a regime in which
women are free to say no to sex or to an abortion without pressure
from their male sexual partners, but one in which heterosexual
activity leads, for many women, especially the most vulnerable, to
undesired pregnancies which can be terminated only in the moredangerous illegal abortion market. Given the consequences of preg134. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
135. For a similar argument, see GERAL.D N. ROSENBERG, Tim Hoiiow HOPE:

CAN

CouRTs BRNo ABoUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991).

136. Becker, supra note 78.
137.

CATHARNE A. MACKINNON,

FEmINISM UNMODIIED: DISCOURSES ON LIE AND LAW

(1987); Michael McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion,
review of Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, 58 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1181
(1991).
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nancy, legal abortions are important for both social equality and
women's health. These points, however, only support the need for
abortion rights, not for such rights as a result of binding judicial
review.
There are a number of costs that might well be associated with
the fact that judges, not legislators, have crafted the right to abortion
in this country. As an initial matter, it is important to realize that
state legislatures were already easing access to abortion and would
have continued in this direction had the Supreme Court not done
so. With the exception of Ireland (whose situation is obviously
different from ours), European countries greatly eased access to
abortion during the seventies. And in those nations, abortion is
much less controversial than it is today in the United States.'38 The
legal abortion rate began rising rapidly in 1969, four years before
Roe v. Wade, and actually slowed after the decision. 3 9 Most legal
abortions performed today would be legal had Roe v. Wade gone
the other way.
Some commentators believe that it was the judicial nature of
the easing of abortion restrictions in the United States that roused
such fanatical opposition,)4 making it difficult often for women to
find an abortion provider without traveling long distances or to
enter a clinic once they reach it. Indeed, opposition to the increasing
legalization of abortion seems to have increased significantly immediately after Roe v. Wade.14 ' Limits on Medicaid funding for
abortion (eliminating effective abortion rights for many poor women)
arose only after Roe v. Wade.142 Violent and harassing anti-abortion
4
tactics also followed Roe v. Wade. 1
In many ways, the judicial origins of women's right to abortion
following Roe v. Wade were a source of vulnerability. Judicial
resolution of so controversial and open a question inevitably fed
the opposition because it made palpable the countermajoritarian
difficulty; where can these nine men point for a legitimate authoritative source for their decision? That constitutional law is a system
of precedent grounded in tradition was, of course, part of the
problem; tradition is not a powerful source of rights important to
138.

MARY ANN GLENDON,

ABORTION AND DVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAIL-

uses, EuRoPEAN CHALLENGES 10-62 (1987).
139. ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 178-79.
140. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 138.

141. ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 185-89.
142. Id. at 186-87.
143. Id. at 188.
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women. Consider, for example, the fact that constitutional scholars,

no matter how liberal, seemed wholly unable to imagine a defense
of Roe v. Wade throughout the seventies, with the result that the
basis of any right to abortion seemed weak indeed.'" Had the issue
been resolved by democratic legislatures, the resolution would have
been perceived as of greater legitimacy.141

Judicial resolution also impeded the development of a new
consensus on abortion through legislative and political activity in
which all could participate. Perhaps, had the issue stayed a legislative

one, the compromise reached in all or many states would have
seemed legitimate, or at least legitimate enough to make harassment
(and worse) of clinic workers and women entering clinics seem
inappropriate, even to most anti-choice activists. It is true that
religious fundamentalism rose during this period, but many fundamentalists might have seen a legislative resolution of the issue as

more legitimate than Roe v. Wade.
Although Roe v. Wade seemed to make abortion an absolute

right during the first trimester, the Court has been diligent in
protecting the right to abortion only for relatively well-off women:
adult women who can afford an abortion or whose health insurance
covers it. In addition, it helps if one either lives in a very large city
or is able to travel whatever distance is necessary to obtain an
144. See, e.g., ARcHmALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SuPRaEm COURT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT 53-55, 114 (1976); ALEXANDER M. BiCKEL, TIE MORA= OF COSMENT 28 (1975);
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 223, 297 (1973); Paul A. Freund, Storms Over
the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983).
Equality arguments did not begin appearing until 1979. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sexual
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Brief for the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-25, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Calabresi, supra note 1, at 146-49; Donald Regan, Rewriting
Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1569 (1979).
145. Perhaps, had Supreme Court used a different rationale, the opposition might have
been less virulent. I rather doubt, however, that the rationale mattered. Objections to Roe v.
Wade are based in large part on objections to change in traditional sex roles, and no matter
how the decisions were justified, choice does foster women's ability to make nontraditional
choices. On the relationship between attitudes on choice and commitment to traditional sex
roles, see

LUKER,

supra note 104.

In addition, any equality basis would have been very novel and would likely have only
strengthened the perception that protection of fetal life mandated opposition to equality for
women as well as to choice. Coming from the Court, rather than as a result of democratic
processes in which all participated, the abortion decision might well have sparked powerful
opposition regardless of its logic.
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abortion. Younger women, poorer women, and many women in
small towns and rural areas are not well protected by the decision.'4
The lines drawn by the Court have fragmented women as a political
coalition, giving absolute rights to those most likely to be able to
exercise power through the electoral and legislative processes, while
leaving unmet the needs of women too young to vote or too poor
to have much political power.
Although these decisions merely allowed legislative enactments
to stand, the legislation was passed after the Supreme Court had
taken the wind out of the sails of pro-choice activists and had
provoked virulent opposition to choice by deciding the issue using
binding judicial review. Had both sides been focused on the legislative level throughout the seventies and eighties without the distorting political effects of Roe v. Wade, it is possible that the laws
passed during that period would not have been so harmful, particularly to poor and young women. Thus, if powerful, pro-choice
women had been more involved in legislative reform for their own
sake, they might have also demanded legislation that would have
better served the needs of less powerful women: poor women and
young women.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's commitment to Roe v. Wade
did not turn out to be entirely reliable, even for those women best
protected by the Supreme Court decisions in this area. After Web4
ster, 47 it looked as though Roe might fall at any time. With Casey,1 8
it became clear that one more Bush appointment would be necessary.
Had Bush won the election, it is most likely that Roe would have
fallen within the next four years. Women would then have had to
press for choice at the legislative level without the more-favorable
state laws that would have been so easy to pass in the seventies but
for Roe. And, of course, we are now safe only through the next
four years. Roe may yet fall.
The greatest cost of judicially-created abortion rights may have
been political: Roe v. Wade has encouraged women to take their
eyes off legislative arenas and grass roots organization and to rely
instead on the Supreme Court as their protector. Had Roe v. Wade
146. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Aschroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Pub. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (requiring parental or judicial consent for
young women to obtain abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a bar

on the use of federal funds even for medically necessary abortions). See also ROSENBERO,
supra note 135, at 189-201.
147. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
148. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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gone the other way, considerable feminist time and energy during
the seventies likely would have been exerted on pressuring legislative
bodies to make needed changes and on election of women to political
office for this purpose. Roe v. Wade inevitably deprived women of
the valuable political experience and power they would have gained
in this drive. 4 9 In the end, abortion rights for all women, including
young women, poor women, and rural women require, even now,
legislative protection.
On the other hand, Roe v. Wade has not been overruled as
yet and may not be in the future. And we have probably had a
broader right to choose (for those who are old enough and have
the means to exercise it) under Roe v. Wade than that which might
have been the result of legislative changes in the seventies. Such
reforms would likely, in many or most states, have given women
only the right to petition some medical board for a determination
that abortion was medically necessary, the dominant form in some
European countries. 50 And poor women, young women, minority
women often have difficulty negotiating such requirements.
On balance, it is impossible to know how even to approach
the question of whether binding judicial review in the context of
abortion has helped or hurt women. Without a doubt, there are
circumstances under which it is easier for some women today to get
an abortion than would be the case today had all reform been in
the legislative arena. For example, it is likely that some states would
not have allowed abortion on demand. On the other hand, opposition to abortion might be much weaker in such states (and elsewhere), so that abortion providers would be easier to find in many
areas, clinics easier to enter, and more abortions for poor women
funded by the state. Some women are doubtless better off, some
worse off. It is, however, clear that Roe v. Wade was not an
unmixed blessing.
Whether Roe v. Wade's continuing vitality helps or hurts women
is even more complicated. Even if we could know that the Court's
initial decision in Roe v. Wade was a mistake, we still could not
know whether the elimination of binding judicial review in this area
149. See Vicki Quade, Who Governs America: Human Rights Interview with Akhil

Amar, 18
150.

HUMAN RTS.
GLENDON,

26, 30 (1991).

supra note 138, at 21. Not all. France, for example, has an absolute

right to choose during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy, since the choice of whether to have
an abortion is made by the woman alone. The statute does say that abortion is available if

her "condition places her in a situation of distress." Id. at 15. Abortion is also elective in
early pregnancy in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Norway, and Sweden. Id. at 14.
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today would be good for women. By entering this fray, the Court
changed the situation and we cannot now return to the status quo
ante of early 1973. It may well be that women would be better off
politically were Roe v. Wade reversed tomorrow, as reflected by the
fact that many pro-abortion groups wanted Casey decided prior to
the 1992 election (expecting Roe v. Wade to be reversed). On the
other hand, reversal would doubtless hurt some women forced to
have illegal abortions in the aftermath. Much depends on whether,
how, and when the Court reverses Roe v. Wade. If the Court
ultimately does reverse Roe v. Wade when the general climate is
even more hostile to legal abortion than it is today, some women
would in some sense be better off with Roe v. Wade reversed today,
so that legislative protections could be established during a relatively
favorable period.''
I have not, of course, "proven" that women would be better
off today had we no binding judicial review. Perhaps I am wrong,
and without the legitimation the Court provided for the norm of
sexual equality and abortion rights, women would have done even
more poorly in legislatures and elsewhere in the political arena. Or
perhaps it made no difference, one way or the other. We cannot
be sure. I suspect, however, that if we had no binding judicial
review, women would have focused from an earlier date, as we do
increasingly today, on women's direct participation in electoral politics. This focus would have been necessary both to eliminate the
archaic laws on the books in 1971 and to enact new laws better
geared to women's needs, such as better abortion laws.
There are advantages and disadvantages to binding judicial
review from the perspective of women; this, like other strategy
questions, is one in which we face a double bind. There are risks
we run when we rely on women's democratic power, as well as
risks when we rely on mostly male judges operating within a system
of precedent built by an almost entirely male judiciary.
Judicial review may function as a pressure valve, 5 2 resulting in
enough minor change in the short-term to preclude pressure for

151. Different generations of women would of course have conflicting interests on this
point. Women fertile today might be better off with Roe on the books until they are unlikely
to become pregnant, whereas younger generations might be better off with reversal today so
that more favorable state laws (than those on the books today) could be in place by the time
they reach fertility.
152. Thus, periodic realignments of constitutional doctrine which might appear to justify
our constitutional order by more inclusive rulings (rulings purportedly protecting those excluded
from the founding) may actually be conservative, entrenching the status quo with little real
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significant and more effective change in the long term. For example,
to the extent that Reed v. Reed and subsequent equal protection
cases were victories for women, they represent minor short-term
wins whose success inevitably defused mounting pressure for real
change in the status of the sexes. In part, the trade off may have
been between immediate justice in certain individual cases and real,
significant, long-term change.
I suspect that both the upside and downside probability of
change for women will be larger with legislative bodies, so that
legislative bodies are both more likely to institute awful laws and
excellent laws (from the perspective of women) than those that
would be enacted and survive in a world with binding judicial
review. The enactment of awful laws would, however, goad women
to greater direct political participation; such laws need not survive
long given women's majority status. In recent years we have seen
at least two instances in which women's political effectiveness seemed
to increase as a result of decisions that made women angry: (1)
Webster, when it looked like Roe v. Wade was about to crumble
entirely in the very near future; and (2) the appointment of Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court despite Anita Hill's testimony and
his apparently undisputed record as a consumer of pornography.
Both events increased women's determination to elect more women
into legislative bodies. In the next election, for example, women's
presence in the Senate increased 300 percent. We will never, I
suspect, see equality without substantial upside possibility for change.
I therefore favor the strategy with the greatest upside: no binding
judicial review.
II.

THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JuDIcIAL REVIEW

Commentators have advanced two major justifications for judicial review in the face of the objections outlined earlier. The first
is that judges are more principled or trustworthy decisionmakers
than the populace, particularly with respect to protecting outsider
groups, such as unpopular speakers or racial minorities. The second
is that judicial review indirectly serves democratic ends, and does
so more effectively than commitment of all issues to democratic
politics would. This section first considers the need to protect
change while taking off pressure for real change through ordinary politics. Cf. FRANK
MICHEL--N, LAW'S REPUBLiC 1493, 1515-32 (1988) (justifying progressive constitutional decisions without considering this danger).
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minorities from the tyranny of the majority and then the justification
based on judicial review's democratic ends.
A.

Judges As More PrincipledDecisionmakers

There are two forms of this argument. One is that judges are
more principled-reach better decisions-in general, particularly perhaps in speech cases: judges can better protect unpopular speakers
from the tyranny of the majority. The other is that judges protect
racial minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
1. Judges as more principled with respect to unpopular

speech.

3

It is quite likely that judges reach different decisions that those
that would result from democratic processes. That, of course, is
part of the problem with binding judicial review in a democracy.
Are judges decisions more "principled"? That they are is a very
difficult proposition to support. As Ely has noted, "[e]xperience
suggests that in fact there will be a systematic bias in judicial choice
of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of the
upper-middle, professional class from which most lawyers and judges,
and for that matter most moral philosophers, are drawn."' Brest
adds "the Court sometimes has exhibited a striking insensitivity and
55
indifference to the poor.'
Judges are more likely to protect certain forms of speech than
is the general public. 5 6 But free speech doctrine is not particularly
principled in any natural sense. The Court has created an array of
doctrinal boxes for speech issues, and determines the result by
picking the box. Some boxes protect speech strongly, others do not.
The array produced by democratic processes would doubtless be
different, but it would not for that reason be less principled. Why,
for example, should we consider a judicially-created doctrine that
pornography cannot be constitutionally regulated as more "principled" than the contrary decision, particularly when the cost of such
freedom is born overwhelmingly by a group rather different from
the decisionmakers?
153. BICKEL, supra note 2; RONAW DwoRKiN, A MA'rER OF PRINciLE 31-71 (1985);
ELY, supra note 4, at 105-35.
154. ELY, supra note 4, at 58-59.
155. Brest, supra note 3, at 667.
156. Id.; Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405 (1986);
BICKEL, supra note 2, at 49-65.
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With Robert Nagel, I suspect that binding judicial review is
not particularly effective at protecting unpopular speech or promoting a more tolerant society.' 57 Nagel notes that it was politicians,
not judges, who ended each period in our history in which speech
was severely repressed (such as the McCarthy era). 5 Binding judicial
review might actually be counterproductive, producing a backlash
against unpopular speech that cannot possibly be monitored by
judges. Speech and tolerance might be better fostered by allowing
such unfortunate periods to run their course and seek correction in
the political branches.3 9 Michael McConnell has concluded that
religious minorities receive (like women, I suspect) better protection
from legislatures than courts60
Although often extremely critical of what the Justices have
done under the guise of judicial review, legal scholars nevertheless,
6
as Nagel has pointed out, tend to believe in binding judicial review.' '
It seems possible that legal scholars consider judges better, more
principled decisionmakers simply because they themselves come from
the same professional class and share the same values. In addition,
they may aspire to being judges or even justices some day, and are
likely to imagine themselves deciding cases in a more principled way
than the polity would. The view that judges are better decisionmakers seems likely to reflect simply the similarities between federal
judges and elite mostly white male scholars who assert this view.1' 6
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make the
judges-are-more-principled argument as free speech becomes an increasingly conservative right. 63 Initially, free speech claims were
brought by draft resisters, labor organizers, civil rights activists,
pacifists, communists, and similar progressive or left groups with
less than their share of power and all too easily silenced by a hostile
majority. ' 6
Today, free speech claims are increasingly likely to be brought
by rich, powerful, commercial entities (including tobacco companies
157. Nagel, supra note 57.
158. Id. at 334.
159. Id. at 334-449. But see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985).
160. Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom: A Surprising Pattern, 11 CmusTN LEGL
Soc'Y Q. 5 (1990).
161. Nagel, supra note 57, at 312.
162. See CATHARiwE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMwNST THEORY OF THE STATE 162-

63 (1989) (male jurisprudence adopts male perspective as objectivity).
163. See Schauer, supra note 27; Balkin, supra note 27.
164. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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and pornographers), by racist speakers, or to challenge progressive
campaign reform legislation 165 As J.M. Balkin has noted, with the
fall of absolute freedom of contract, conservative forces today are
increasingly finding the absolutist First Amendment an effective
substitute. 166 It is likely that increasingly, the First Amendment will
conflict with equality and meaningful democracy. 167 Formal guarantees, of the kind the First Amendment has turned into, "generally
6
favor those groups in society that are already the most powerful."'1
If speech continues to come to mean protection equally of the
speech of the powerful and powerless, it is likely to be increasingly
conservative, so that the net effect on racial minorities and other
unpopular speakers' 69 is negative.
Judicial review has never effectively protected most speech
because it only reaches government prohibitions or restrictions on
speech. Consider how effectively the "free" speech of lesbians,
bisexuals, and gay men is protected by today's "absolute" First
Amendment. Despite the First Amendment, the vast majority of
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men are still closeted (and thereby denied
effective political participation' 70 ) as a result of a million and one
discriminatory, harassing, and abusive practices throughout society,
in private and public arenas. Often, discrimination is aimed at
keeping lesbians and gay men in the closet, that is, silent. Often,
the discrimination is by government. It is still invisible and a matter
of indifference to most federal judges, no matter how "absolute"
their protection of speech.
The ban on open lesbian and gay military personnel illustrates
this point well. Few who support the ban expect it to-or even
want it to-actually exclude these valuable soldiers. Rather, the
point is to keep lesbians and gay men silent, so that heterosexuals
(who are free to flaunt their sexuality) need not encounter the

165. Balkin, supra note 27, at 376-78.
166. Id. at 384.

167. Id.at 423.
168. Id.at 396.
169. R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
170. See Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Caroline Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985).

But note that lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men have been protected
Clause of the First Amendment, under which they have won a few cases,
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. See William B. Rubenstein,
Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality?: Some Reflections on the
From a Lesbian/Gay Perspective, 2 LAw & SaxuALrry 19 (1992).

by the Free Speech
that by the equality
Since When Is the
Hate Speech Debate
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expression of others'.' 7 And most closeting takes place in "private"
areas, such as private employment, friendships, and most especially,
families. It would be futile to look to federal judges to ensure that,
through binding judicial review under a Constitution with primarily
negative rights, lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men are free to speak.
To date, free speech enforced by judges under binding judicial
review, has not meant either free speech for all (even in the most
limited sense, ignoring differential distribution of resources) nor
tolerance. There is no reason, beyond blind faith in the federal
judiciary, to think that in the foreseeable future binding judicial
review will lead us to this promised land. 7 2
2.

Judges are more principled decisionmakers in
protecting racial minoritiesfrom the tyranny of the
73
majority.1

Perhaps the most accepted justification for judicial review today, at least among legal scholars, is the need to protect outsider
groups-such as racial minorities-from the majority, the latter
being too likely to impose on others costs they would not impose
on themselves. 174
As indicated in the introduction, I do not try to resolve the
question whether binding judicial review of racial classifications is
actually good for racial minorities. We could continue to have
binding judicial review for racial classifications, however, even if
we were to have only limited judicial review for sex-based classifications and fundamental rights such as speech or abortion. On the
other hand, as also noted earlier, it may be that the objections to
75
judicial review apply to review of racial classifications as well.
171. See, e.g., De Tran & Jodi Wilgoren, Debate Fervent in O.C. on Gay-Military
Issue, L.A. Tnsas, Jan. 29, 1993, at Al (one opponent expressed fear of "'knowing there
is a known homosexual standing next to me in the shower;" issue described as "allowing
gays to serve openly"); Delia M, Rios, Restrictions Are Hot Topic Across U.S.; Radio
Shows Flooded With Calls; Public Split, DALLAS MoRNO NEws, Jan. 29, 1993, at IA
(issue whether "openly gay men and women should be allowed to serve in the military").
Even were lesbians and gay men allowed to serve openly, most would remain closeted
because of the many risks they would run even if formally allowed to speak by military
regulations. See, e.g., Tran & Wilgoren, supra, at Al (two supporters note that most
lesbian and gay soldiers would stay in the closet).
172. See Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism,. Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. CoxLo. L. REv. 1061 (1993).
173. BICKEL, supra note 2; DwoRaxN, supra note 153, at 31-71; ELY, supra note 4, at
135-79.
174. See Calabresi, supra note 1; Nagel, supra note 57.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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Some commentators see binding judicial review as an important
protection for minority speech, citing the early Supreme Court cases
76
protecting civil rights activists under First Amendment doctrine.
But recent cases have extended equal First Amendment protection
77
to racist speech, the point of which is to silence racial minorities.
Further, as Charles Lawrence has noted, even when the Court has
used the First Amendment to protect activists, protection has only
been extended to peaceful protesters, 7 1 though disruptive protest
may be as or more politically effective. On balance, many scholars
believe that free speech now serves more to suppress than to protect
79
minority speech.
B.

Judicial Review Serves Democratic Ends

There are several ways in which this point is made. All seem
to agree that binding judicial review is most appropriate to ensure
universal access to the ballot; a necessary prerequisite for a legitimate
democracy, but one that affords only an extremely narrow scope
for such review. I do not discuss this justification since I have no
quarrel with judicial review so limited.8 0
Perhaps judicial review serves democratic ends by eliminating
some of the agency problems associated with electoral politics,
particularly elected officials' tendency to act contra to the majority
in their own self-interest and to serve best the interests of those
who contribute most to campaigns.' 8 ' Whether judicial review serves
these democratic ends is an empirical question. And on issues
important to women, the empirical evidence, discussed earlier, suggests that federal judges are less accountable to women than are
legislators. This makes sense. Federal judges and state and federal
legislators are overwhelmingly male, with interests and perceptions
often at odds with women's. The relevant difference is that legis176. See, e.g.,

HARRY KAtVIN, JR., THE NEGRo AND ima FiRsT AME4DMENT (1965).
177. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
178. Lawrence, supra note 27, at 467 & n.130.
179. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 27; Matsuda, supra note 27; Lawrence,
supra note 27.
180. It is, however, true that nonjudicial fora were more hospitable to women seeking
the vote than judicial fora. See supra text accompanying note 95. But the decades and decades
of enormous effort put into winning the vote for women in the end achieved little beyond
the vote itself. It seems unlikely that much is lost when courts enforce voting rights, though
executive and congressional action is likely to be more effective. See RosEaNo, supra note
135, at 57-63.
181. See Akhil Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1043 (1988).
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lators must compete for women's support; judges need not. Judicial
review is therefore unlikely to eliminate agency problems for women.
One modern justification, as many commentators have argued,
is that judicial review of government restrictions on speech are
particularly important for democratic reasons: vigorous debate in
the marketplace of ideas will serve democratic goals by giving voters
information about various options. Another is Ackerman's theory
of democratic moments establishing constitutional principles: judges
are simply enforcing the rules of higher law agreed to by the people
in a constitutional moment.8 2
1.

Free speech: promoting vigorous political debate.

Many scholars today argue that the Free Speech Clauses of the
First Amendment are designed to, and should be interpreted as,
fostering a marketplace of ideas where vigorous debate on important
issues takes place in a democracy.'83 There is considerable tension
between this purpose and the very notion of binding judicial review,
however, since binding judicial review itself degrades political debate
by taking important issues and principles off the political agenda.
It may well be, as Bickel and Thayer suspected, that there would
be more informed and vigorous political debate were there no
binding judicial review. It is, for example, exceedingly difficult to
engage in public debate about pornography without becoming completely bogged down in the constitutionality of regulation in light
of specific Supreme Court decisions. That becomes the important
(and often the only) question.
Democratic deliberations are also degraded by the poor quality
of judicial decisions, which often are inconsistent with clear thinking
and hide the ball. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court equality decisions, discussed earlier, which obscure the conflict between
eliminating rules consistent with traditional sex roles and adequately
protecting women who continue to regard children as primarily their
responsibility.
The greatest weakness with this justification-that binding judicial review is necessary for political speech-is that, as Schauer
182. ACKERMAN, supra note 5. I discuss in detail Ackerman's presentation of this
justification. Elster gives a similar one, noting that citizens can bind themselves to a constitution
in order to protect themselves from subsequent folly or error. The difficulty with this way
of putting the point is the same as the difficulty with Ackerman's: women did not so bind
themselves.
183. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 1, at 113; ALEXANDER MEniKEJoHN, FR-EE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
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and Balkin have noted, free speech is increasingly conservative, a
doctrine that protects the speech of the powerful, including pornographers, racists, and other powerful actors.'1 4 Free speech has
become a formal right, and as such will increasingly be conservative,
reinforcing the power of the powerful rather than fostering either
rigorous dissent or a system in which all citizens are able to speak.
For example, campaign finance reform, which many see as a necessary prerequisite for both meaningful democracy and quality democratic deliberations, is limited by "free" speech cases.' 85
Thus far in this section, I have considered various forms of
the political speech-enhancing justification for binding judicial review. None is very compelling if such review harms women, a
majority group much of whose political speech has for too long
been missing from democratic deliberations.
2.

We the people acting in a constitutional moment.

The difficulty with this argument, if used to justify judicial
review in the face of the problems it poses for women, is that
women, though a majority group, did not participate in the relevant
constitutional moments. Most women have only been able to vote
on constitutional issues since the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920. Since then, amendments have been fairly
technical and of little importance to women.'1 Women were excluded entirely from the drafting of the original Constitution and
Bill of Rights and were only rarely admitted to significant discussions. 8 7 Indeed, at these most basic of constitutional moments,
women were not permitted to speak in public.'88 The one woman,
Mercy Otis Warren, known to have published a pamphlet on the
184. See Schauer, supra note 27; Balkin, supra note 27.
185. See Schauer, supra note 27; Balkin, supra note 27, at 378.
186. Amendment 20 provides certain terms and sucessorship for the President, Vice
President, and Congress; Amendment 21 repealed prohibition; Amendment 22 limits the term
of the President; Amendment 23 gave the District of Columbia the right to representation in
the electoral college; Amendment 24 gives citizens the right to vote in federal elections despite
failure to pay taxes; Amendment 25 provides for a successor for the President or Vice
President in cases of removal, death, or incapacity; Amendment 26 gives the right to vote to
those 18 or older.
187. As Akhil Amar has noted, "[i]n the debates over the Constitution and Bill of
Rights, only one woman-Mercy Otis Warren-had participated prominently, and even then
under a pseudonym." Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
188. This was, of course, a matter of social practice rather than legal right. Women first
spoke in public in significant numbers during the early decades of the abolition movement.
FLEXNER,

supra note 93, at 41.
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Constitution while its adoption was being considered, published
anonymously 18 9 and opposed judicial review as dangerous because
unbounded. 190
Ackerman's constitutional moments are not, however, limited
to formal amendment processes. Women might be considered to
have participated, in some sense, in both the Reconstruction and
New Deal moments, and women could actually vote at the later
moment. But neither of these moments focused on extending binding
judicial review for speech, sex equality, or fundamental rights.
Indeed, the scope of contemporary review in these areas was unforeseeable at those moments.
In addition, the reconstruction amendments, over the vigorous
objections of many women activists, extended the vote only to
African American men. In so doing, also over the objections of
many women activists, the word "male" was added for the first
time to the Constitution. 19 Although the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have been understood

by its drafters as guaranteeing certain rights for all, including women,
subsequent judicial decisions denied any such effect. 192 Women's
informal and ineffective participation in a process from which they

189. The pamphlet seems to have been originally "signed" by a "Columbian Patriot."
See table of contents entry for "Gerry, Elbridge." Observations on the New Constitution,
and on the Federal and State Conventions By a Columbian Patriot, in PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURINo ITS DISCUSSION BY TE PEOPLE 17871788, at 2 (Paul Leicester ed., 1988) (page 4 is the first numbered page in main body of
book; one reaches page 2 by counting backwards from 4). Until recently, historians attributed
the pamphlet to a man, Gerry Elbridge. See Janis L. McDonald, The Need for Contextual
ReVision: Mercy Otis Warren, A Case in Point, 5 YALE J. L. & FEM. 183, 185 n.5 (1992)
(explaining that the pamphlet attributed by early histories to Elbridge Gerry was by Mercy
Otis Warren).
190. See Gerry Elbridge, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and
State Conventions By a Columbian Patriot, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITrTION OF THE
UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787-1788, at 4 (Paul
Leicester ed., 1988):
There are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers, they seem to be left
as a boundless ocean, that has broken over the chart of the Supreme Lawgiver,
"thus far shalt thou go and no further," and as they cannot be comprehended by
the clearest capacity, or the most sagacious mind, it would be an Herculean labor
to attempt to describe the dangers with which they are replete.
191. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for representation according to
the number of male citizens in a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
192. See Nina Morais, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost History,
97 YALE L.J. 1153 (1988); Sandy Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Case for Equal Treatment (unpublished article) (on file with
author); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385 (1992).
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were formally excluded cannot be a basis for inferring consent to
binding judicial review.
Furthermore, no participant in the Reconstruction moment could
have guessed at the current scope of binding judicial review. For
example, at the time of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court had
never struck a statute as unconstitutional under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. 9a Further, the proponents of the
equality provision of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have
foreseen that the right to equality would always be trumped by the
speech clause of the previously-enacted First Amendment.
The New Deal moment, focused as it was on the elimination
of judicial review in the context of market regulations can hardly
legitimate judicial review in other contexts. More particularly, the
focus of that constitutional moment was not on extending judicial
review for sex equality (the first case was 1971), free speech (the
first decisions holding unconstitutional governmental action and
doing so squarely on the First Amendment had just been decided'9),
nor abortion (Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973195). Indeed, the
scope of current review in these areas would have been unimaginable
to most people at the time. Thus, the New Deal adjustment does
not justify judicial review in the areas of particular concern to
women.
Ackerman does not, of course, argue that women were included
in any constitutional moments or that the current scope of binding
judicial review for free speech or sex discrimination could have been
foreseen at in any constitutional moment. The latter point he seems
to avoid entirely. Instead, he seems to give two reasons why women
and minorities should be considered bound by constitutional moments from which they were excluded. The first begins with the
statement that the "old-timers provided a constitutional language
and institutions through which later generations of women and
blacks have won fuller citizenship." 1 96 This is, of course, true; but
that things might have been worse-so that women and African
Americans might have been excluded from citizenship for hundreds
of years after the founding-cannot legitimate a constitutional process from which they were excluded, however.
193. The first case was in 1931. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
194. The first case was Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The thrust of the
early cases was not today's formal and conservative libertarian right to free speech, but
instead a "rich public debate" theory of the First Amendment. See Daniel Hildebrand, Free
Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST. CO
TAirYv 133 (1993).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 316.

1028

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Ackerman follows this initial sentence with the assertion that
"neither the women's movement nor the civil rights movement has
'
sought to repudiate the country's higher law making heritage.' 9
Indeed, both groups "used the inclusionary potential of this tradition
to advantage."' 198 Of course these movements worked within the
system to some extent. And many of the leaders of both movements
thought that Supreme Court review would advance their cause. In
this belief, they may well have been wrong. I speak from the
perspective of a second generation;199 the difficulty of seeing initially
the problems that might arise is quite understandable. These uncertainties reinforce my pragmatic objection to binding judicial review
and may thus seem to strengthen the case against it: it is quite
difficult to know, without trial and error, what will work and what
will not work when attempting to change social inequalities. And
trial and error is much more easily done with nonbinding judicial
review given judicial commitment to precedent, a commitment
grounded in large part on the need to preserve the judiciary's own
legitimacy rather than the needs and interests of those whose "rights"
the Justices are determining." That many of the leaders of the
women's and civil rights movements did not see these problems in
advance would not legitimate a system whose structure preserves
political dominance of a democracy by a minority group of white
men. 201
Moreover, the leaders of the women's movement did not rep-

resent all women. Their interests were often in sharp conflict with
the interests of ordinary and minority women on the key question
of how to approach sexual inequality, as many recent feminist
commentators have pointed out. And the standard they, with only
partial success,202 urged on the Court serves their interests better

than the interests of many ordinary and minority women, women
who are less likely to be similarly situated to men. 20 1 That some
leaders of the feminist movement tried to use judicial review cannot
be a basis for finding consent by all women no matter how disparate
their interests.
Ackerman has a second response that begins with a statement
suggesting he does see the problem in light of the exclusionary
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Cf. Williams, supra note 117.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
See Becker, supra note 77; Becker, supra note 13.
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nature of the key constitutional moments and binding judicial review's potential to block needed legislative reform by outsider groups:
even if oppressed social groups could gain a normal political
victory at the polls, [binding judicial review requires that] ....
[riather than proceeding immediately to social reform ..... the
ascendant coalition would have to confront the resistance of the
courts, and other preservationist institutions, if their program
strikes at the heart of traditional constitutional values.2
But Ackerman's answer is wholly nonresponsive; I quote it, in
its entirety, in the margin. 2° Nowhere does Ackerman seriously
consider the possibility that binding judicial review in discrimination
204. AcKERmAN, supra note 5, at 317.
205. Id. at 316-17:
It strikes me as facile to suppose that social justice will come to America in a
single burst of lawmaking that follows a single electoral victory ....
I believe that
dualism [a combination of binding judicial review under constitutional principles
and the ability of We the people to modify the Constitution in constitutional
moments] is far sounder in its instincts. Lasting progress will require an extended
period of citizen mobilization through which reformers confront the doubts of their
fellow Americans and win the consent of many, if not all, to the need for
fundamental change in the name of justice.
I do not understate the magnitude of the task. At no time since the 1920's
has the movement for social justice in American been as fractionated as today.
Rather than bonding with one another, the labor movement and the peace movement, blacks and ethnics, feminists and environmentalists, look upon each other
with anxiety and suspicion. The very thought they might find common groundmuch less common ground with more mainstream Americans-seems to many a
vain illusion. But is it an illusion that we cannot afford to live without.
There can be no knock-down answer to this question. I have been trying to
reassert the revolutionary promise of the constitutional tradition, not guarantee its
performance-which will depend on lots of things beyond our power to predict or
control.
But it will also depend on us. We may reach out to one another-across the
lines of class and caste and race-and work together to build a more just foundation
for our life together; or we may not. Our generation may be numbered amongst
those that found meaning in the work of private citizenship; or we may hand down
to our children a history in which the constitutional achievements of the past
become ever more distant, the distractions of normal politics ever more present,
the call for a new exercise in common citizenship ever more hollow.
All I know is this: Americans have in the past answered this call and have
successfully worked together to build a community more inclusionary and more
just than the one they entered. There is no reason to say that this history has come
to an end.
Nowhere in this passage does Ackerman offer a single justification for binding judicial review
in sex discrimination or speech cases assuming countermajoritarian effects on a majority
group excluded from the key moments of "higher law" making. That lasting progress will
not be accomplished with a single set of legislative changes after a single election is wholly
irrelevant. That progressive coalitions are difficult to build even when a mere majority is
required cannot justify making the task more onerous by requiring a supermajority in a
constitutional moment. That "we" could "reach out to one another" (in a new constitutional
moment?) is also irrelevant. If, in fact, binding judicial review is countermajoritarian in that
it tends to keep women, a majority, in second class status, none of these points can justify
the practice.
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and speech cases might hurt women (or minorities).
Nor does he
ever consider the many important differences between the complexity
of sexual equality and the relative simplicity of the issue in Lochner,2 at least as framed by the Court. In short, Ackerman's
constitutional moments cannot eliminate the countermajoritarian
objection if a majority of citizens were excluded from the creation
of a structure that to this day allows a minority group to dominate
political life.
At this point, I have considered both the arguments against
and for binding judicial review from the perspective of women. The
case for judicial review is weak, at best, for all cases involving
sexual classifications and speech. I think it likely that binding judicial
review in these areas has, overall, been bad for women; women
would be better off today, both in terms of their levels of representation in legislative bodies and in the real world, were there no
binding judicial review in our system of government.
Binding judicial review even for abortion rights has had disadvantages as well as advantages for women, hurting some women,
sometimes, in some ways, in some situations and helping some
women, sometimes, in some ways, in some situations. Whether
binding judicial review in this area has hurt women is unclear; even
less clear is whether reversal of Roe v. Wade at this point, after
twenty years of judicial interference, would be a good thing for
women.
Thus far, my discussion has been fairly abstract. I next turn
to a specific speech issue, in order to make many of these points
more concretely and with less ambiguity.
III.

UNIVERSITY SPEECH:

A

CASE IN POINT

As noted in the introduction, 2°8 these cases are ideal for an
academic to use in evaluating binding judicial review for three
reasons. First, all the action is state action when public universities
regulate speech, whether through grades, hiring and tenure decisions,
or the other routine assessments discussed below. Thus, the inquiry
is not confounded by the public-private distinction, one which tends
to keep issues important to women beyond the scope of what is
206. See supra notes 47-50, 82-90, 116-36 and accompanying text.
207. Freedom of contract would be an exceedingly complex issue from a progressive
perspective, were courts to determine how to achieve real freedom of contract in light of
differential bargaining power.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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perceived as government action (and hence beyond the scope of
effective judicial review for apparently sound, neutral reasons).
Second, academics know how universities really work, a necessary
prerequisite to spotting regulation of speech by any entity. To the
extent regulation is embedded in traditional practices in subtle ways,
it will be difficult or impossible for an outsider to perceive speech
regulation in an institutional setting. Third, this is a small and
manageable area in which to assess the effects of judicial review,
one in which it is possible to reach firm conclusions (in contrast to
areas as broad as abortion, sex equality, and free speech in general).
As other scholars have noted, free speech is today conservative
in a number of ways. For example, free speech is conservative
because it is only a negative right, protecting the speech of those
with the resources to speak.0 Free speech is conservative because
only the government is bound by this important constitutional
provision. Powerful private actors, such as the media, are free to
distort and suppress the speech of others and do, yet political
processes cannot be used to correct such distortions or suppressions.
To the extent groups subordinated by private speech have greater
access to government than to the media, free speech is conservative. 210 Free speech is conservative because judges worry about chilling powerful pornographers, but not at all about the chilling
pornography causes. 2I
Yet, free speech is conservative in a more basic sense when
enforced by judges. Even when all the action in the area is state
action and only relatively privileged people-those able to attend
universities-are involved, federal judges cannot see free speech
claims when power is exercised in traditional ways. The implications
for women and racial minorities are clear: speech claims are unlikely
to be available to them when they are discriminated against by
universities because of the content of their speech, yet courts are
likely to bar attempts to protect them as new entrants to university
communities from which they have traditionally been excluded.
There is a second problem with binding judicial review when
considered in light of the Supreme Court's recent embrace of a no209. See Schauer, supra note 27; Balkin, supra note 27; see also Owen M. Fiss, Why
the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1987).
210. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 313 (1989) ("Which
is worse-to leave pornographers subject to the vicissitudes of silencing by the lawmaking
activities of political majorities, or to leave women subject to the vicissitudes of silencing by
the private publishing activities of pornographers?").
211. Id.
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viewpoint regulation approach to speech cases: 2 2 the viewpoint fallacy. Judges, like other human beings, lack the ability to see what
is viewpoint discrimination and what is not. We do not perceive as
"viewpoint" perspectives that we take for reality, though we might
see it when an entity acts in new, nontraditional ways. Given the
need for new solutions if we are to end systemic subordination of
women, limitations on viewpoint regulation by government powerfully support the status quo of male domination.
In recent years, a number of universities, public and private,
have adopted speech codes of various sorts designed to protect
women and other groups targeted for harassment on their campuses.
There is no Supreme Court case squarely on point, but dicta in
R.A. V.213 suggests that the current Justices would strike any such
code in a public university. 2 4 In the lower federal courts, such codes
have tended to fall because they regulate speech in terms of content,
that is, whether it is racist or sexist, whether it harms women and
215
minorities.
At first, this result might seem inescapable. We think of universities as places created for exploration of all sorts of ideas in a
free and open atmosphere. But closer consideration of the functions
of universities reveals that this initial reaction is naive. Although an
amazing number of authors have written articles on the constitutionality of speech codes, only Stanley Fish actually describes realistically what it is we in universities do. 216 As Fish points out, if
universities "were only places to encourage free expression ... it
would be hard to say why there would be any need for classes, or
examinations, or departments, or disciplines or libraries, since freedom of expression requires nothing but a soapbox or an open
212. R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
213. Id.
214. Everyone seems to agree that private universities are free to restrict speech as they
wish since the Constitution does not apply to them.
215. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding policy
unconstitutional as a violation of free speech; although University argued that its policy did
not apply in the classroom, court stresses possibility that it might be applied in classroom
discussions); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (similar holding; again, University argues that the rule would not apply in
the classroom); IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F.
Supp. 792 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discipline of fraternity for out-of-classroom event, including
"dress a sig" event in which a member dressed in black face, with pillows for breasts and
buttocks, and wore a black wig and curlers, held unconstitutional).
216. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too,

in

DEBATING P.C.: TIM CONTROVERSY OVER POLrTICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

(Paul Berman ed., 1992).
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telephone line. '217 But universities are committed to "the investigation and study of matters of fact and interpretation.' '218 As such,
concludes Fish, "the flourishing of free expression will in almost
all circumstances be an obvious good; but in some circumstances,
freedom of expression may pose a threat to that purpose, and at
that point, it may be necessary to discipline or regulate
speech .
*...
"219
I want to expand on Fish's basic point, showing that the
essential business of a university is the regulation of the content of
speech. I use this point to argue against binding judicial review of
university speech codes on the ground that such review is conservative, tending to protect the status quo rather than protect free
speech much, since countless regulations of speech by universitiesin particular, conservative understandings of what is knowledge, of
what is quality scholarship or analysis, and so on-are not recognized as regulation of speech and hence not judicially reviewable.
I begin by describing some of the ways in which universities
regulate speech. Universities are institutions that attempt to advance
our understanding of the world around us and of ourselves. They
are not simply places where speech is valued in itself; it is quality
speech that is valued, and it is valued for its quality, its content,
its viewpoint. These institutions define what counts as knowledge,
as important, relevant to the world and the human condition.
Inevitably, such assessments regulate speech in terms of content,
viewpoint, and even ideology. Indeed, that is the whole point: to
promote quality speech as quality is understood within the relevant
academic community or by the relevant administrator (or both).
Such assessments inevitably turn on content, viewpoint, and
ideology. For example, all American universities suppress the viewpoints that the earth is flat and that the universe revolves around
it. Often speech about issues important to women and minorities is
regulated (suppressed) because those doing the assessing value the
content or viewpoint as low: the problem addressed is considered
trivial or the methodology suspect.' Often, in law, women's issues
are not regarded by powerful men as "intellectually interesting," in
contrast to the issues they are interested in. Women and minorities
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Cf. CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNON, ToWARD

A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE

162-

232 (1989) ("social circumstances, to which gender is central, produce distinctive interests,
hence perceptions, hence meanings, hence definitions of rationality").

1034

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

engaged in feminist or critical race research may lose hiring and
promotion opportunities because of the content of their speech,
their viewpoints, and ideologies. For example, among legal academics, narrative approaches, such as those employed by many feminists
and critical race scholars, are considered of little value by many
powerful people at many schools, including state universities.22
Various disciplines have varying, and often inconsistent, norms
about viewpoints, including political viewpoints. For example, an
expressly political orientation is required in some disciplines at some
universities (for example, english departments) and forbidden in
others (for example, many history departments require an apolitical
stance). Scholars trying to cross disciplinary boundaries may face
inconsistent requirements, and this may be particularly true for
members of groups traditionally excluded from universities, who
may find current disciplinary boundaries an artificial barrier to the
kind of intellectual work they find most valuable.
Of course decisions on hiring and promotion of faculty regulate
speech. This is the most important and effective way in which an
academic institution regulates speech. Much academic speech, particularly in classrooms, student papers, and exams, depends on who
is hired. Speech at a law school without any critical race theorists
will be different from speech at a law school with several. And
hiring and tenure decisions are based on assessments of the quality
of the content of the applicant's speech, the quality of the applicant's
arguments, research, methodology, and, inevitably (especially at the
margins of academic discourse within any discipline), viewpoints.
Regardless of content, no university offers every possible course.
Course offerings are selected according to the content that students
are to be exposed to. Available courses may skip topics students,
particularly women and minorities, consider important; we have all
heard of criminal law courses that do not cover rape. Perhaps (as
at the University of Chicago), there is not a women's studies
department. There may be strong arguments on both sides of whether
to have a department devoted to women's studies, but these arguments are based on and reflect viewpoints and ideologies. They
depend on the speaker's assessment of the content and viewpoint
likely to be promoted by a women's studies department.
221. For a discussion of how scholarship might differ-along ideological as well as other
lines-were there more minority law professors and the political implications of such differences, see Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705.
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In classrooms, women and minority students often have issues
they consider important dismissed by a professor who considers
such issues irrelevant. And there are myriad unwritten (because
every one understands them since they reflect conventional expectations) rules about what is appropriate matter in a classroom
discussion. Such understandings are not made blindly; viewpoint
and ideology are inevitably relevant.
Papers and written exams are graded in terms of the professor's
assessment of the content of the student's knowledge and quality
of her or his reasoning or creative ideas.m If the paper or exam
contains the sorts of knowledge and insights the professor considers
valuable, even if he 223 does not agree with them, it might seem that
the grade is for quality irrespective of viewpoint or ideology. But
that is only because the professor's beliefs (viewpoints, ideologies)
include a range of valuable approaches (though he may not agree
with them all). But if the student's paper or exam had been based
on a viewpoint or ideology the professor considered stupid, irrelevant, irrational, superstitious, or evil, the importance of viewpoint
and ideology to evaluating content would be obvious. Imagine, for
example, that you are grading an essay question on gradations of
punishment for various forms of rape. And imagine that the exam
you are reading argues that rape should be legal, indeed rewarded,
because women enjoy rape; rape is therefore a good thing. You
should be affected by the exam's viewpoint, content, and ideology
in assigning a grade to it.
Graduate students are discouraged from dissertation topics their
advisors consider inappropriate or uninteresting. Whether such advice is helpful or harmful, it regulates speech in terms of content.
A colleague recalls that, in 1968 when she was selecting a topic for
a Ph.D. in political science, she wanted to analyze the treatment of
women in Western political theory (something along the line of
Susan Moller Okin's well-respected first book2) but was discouraged

222. There are countless reports from lesbians, gay men, racial minorities, and other
women about bias in judging their work because of their perspectives and viewpoints. See,
e.g., Mario DiGangi, Promoting Diversity, GSAS NEws, Spring 1993 (inter alia, students feel
a need to take feminist and gay-lesbian analysis out of their essays and papers).
223. I use "he" deliberately since most professors are male, particularly full professors
likely to be most powerful in deciding hiring, tenure, and promotion of others. See Anthony
DePalma, Rare in Ivy League: Women Who Work as Full Professors, N.Y. TusS, Jan. 24,
1993, at I (percentages of full professors who are women at various schools include Brown
(9%); Columbia (13%); Harvard (11%); Pennsylvania (1156); and Yale (90%6)).
224. See SusAN MOLLER OKiN, WOMaN IN WSTERN PorrcA. THoUGHT (1979).
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from doing so by her thesis advisor. He did not regard the topic
as the "stuff" of which Ph.D. dissertations are made. Okin is now
a professor of political science at Stanford. Discouraging a student
from pursuing such a topic is regulation (indeed, suppression) of
speech because of its content, viewpoint, and ideology.
The sorts of regulations described in the preceding paragraphs
are endemic in academic institutions. Indeed, one could make the
same points without any reference to women or minorities: the
essential business of the university is to promote quality speech
(however that is defined) and to suppress low-quality speech.
Thus, traditional, unspoken, rules and understandings about
what speech is high quality permeate university life and turn on
content and viewpoint. The boundaries of every academic conversation, as well as many of the assessments of quality within the
boundaries, turn on questions of content, viewpoint, and ideology.
This is not to deny qualitative differences between various kinds of
academic speech. Rather, the point is that assessments of quality,
whether one agrees or disagrees with those assessments, inevitably
turn on content (that is always obvious) and turn as well (and this
may be obvious only at the boundaries) on one's viewpoint and
ideology.
Further, these assessments, grounded as they inevitably are in
traditional notions of what a discipline is about, what counts as
"truth," and what methods are most valuable, often hurt women
and other newcomers to university communities because many of
these new entrants do look at and value things differently. Indeed,
often the value of their speech lies therein. But, of course, many
powerful people with more conventional perspectives and interests
do not agree. All too often, therefore, such assessments suppress
or undervalue speech that is important to women and minorities.
Yet no court would entertain a constitutional challenge under
the Free Speech Clause grounded in the allegation that a public
university's consideration of the content of speech in any of these
routine ways-in setting courses, syllabi, evaluating a scholar for
hiring or promotion-was unconstitutional.25
What is different about speech codes? Perhaps it is that they
are explicit. But many of these other content-based judgments are
also explicit. Course offerings and syllabi are explicit. Students are
often given feed-back on exams and papers, feed-back that explicitly
225, In two recent cases, lower federal courts have held unconstitutional unusual public
university reactions to racist speech. See Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992);
Jeffries v. Harleston, No. 92-4180KC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6418 (S.D.N.Y., May 11,
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values their work in terms of its content, noting what was "wrong"
and what was "right" about their speech.
Perhaps speech codes are different because they are negative,
ruling certain kinds of speech out of bounds. But many of the
regulations of speech that I have described, none of which receives
a constitutional remedy, are also negative. Convincing my colleague
not to do a dissertation on women in Western political theory is
negative and explicit (though not written). Feed-back on an exam
or paper may be negative and explicit and even written: "I took
off points because you said x, y, z, when a, b, c is true, more
logical, more convincing, or more relevant." The decision to exclude
certain texts from the core canon is negative.
Perhaps routine university assessments are different because
they rate content in terms of quality independent of viewpoint or
ideology. But, as suggested earlier, at the margins of what the
grader considers appropriate discourse in this academic context,
content and viewpoint will inevitably be determinative. For example,
I doubt that any student answering the criminal law exam described
earlier with a defense of rape would do very well. Professors in an
English literature course are not likely to highly value an essay
asserting the viewpoint that this canon is without any artistic or
redeeming social value and says nothing about the social order from
which it sprang. A professor who is a Marxist and a professor who
believes in free markets are likely to have different assessments of
the quality of the same exam or paper, and this is likely to be true
even if they try as hard as they can to judge its worth independent
of their own commitments and even if the paper is within the range
of discourse they consider appropriate. People with different viewpoints or ideologies often seem to have missed a key point or not
to have appreciated its importance and relevance. Inevitably, assessments turn on viewpoint and even ideology.
The courts striking campus speech codes purport to do so
because such codes regulate content, period. None mentions a defense of "but this is a quality assessment." And speech codes do
regulate based on assessment of the quality of racist or sexist speech.
Proponents of such codes consider the intellectual quality of such
speech low in terms of academic contributions, just as graders of
exams grade in terms of their assessments of the quality of speech.
For example, the University of Wisconsin code struck by a
federal district court,2 regulated
226. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991).
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racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive
behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at
different individuals ... if such comments, epithets or other
repressive behavior ... intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability,

sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and

2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment
for education, university-related work, or other university-authorized activity. 2 7
This code assesses racist, sexist, and similarly offensive speech in
terms of its quality in the context of an academic community. As
the University argued in court, such speech "is unlikely to form
any part of a dialogue or exchange of views. ' "m The guide to the
code also illustrates this point. Consider:
Question 1: In a class discussion concerning women in the
workplace, a male student states his belief that women are by
nature better equipped to be mothers than executives, and thus
should not be employed in upper level management positions. Is
this statement actionable under proposed UWS 17.06(2)?
Answer: No. The statement is an expression of opinion,
contains no epithets, is not directed to a particular individual,
and does not, standing alone, evince the requisite intent to demean
or create a hostile environment. 229
Similar assessments of speech quality occur continuously in
university settings. Speech that is considered irrelevant to serious
academic discussion is ruled out of bounds, implicitly or explicitly,
by teachers running classroom discussions, grading exams, papers,
considering dissertation topics, etc. Indeed, routine assessments go
further than the Wisconsin code, since professors often react negatively (with a dismissive or even humiliating comment in class or
a low grade on a paper or exam) to statements of opinion considered
stupid, irrelevant, or mistaken, etc., such as the comment in question
1,above. Furthermore, speech codes can be part of a good education, teaching students important principles of tolerance and respect for all members of university communities.
It is true that speech codes are based upon both assessments
of quality speech in an academic setting and of the harm of
homophobic, racist, or sexist speech. But universities routinely take
227. Id.at 1165.
228. Id.at 1175.
229. Id.at 1166.
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into account the harmful effects of speech at faculty hiring. Often
people (usually women, scholars of color, or critical scholars) are
not hired because they are viewed as too strident and descriptive of
"colleageality," that is, their speech is harmful.
Perhaps it is the disciplinary nature of proceedings under the
speech codes that makes them different from routine assessments
of speech by public universities. But rude dismissals of student
comments in a large class can be quite demeaning and humiliating.
And low grades can lead to precisely the same sorts of negative
events disciplinary proceedings can lead to: probation, suspensions,
or expulsion. Often, disciplinary proceedings lead to far less serious
events: an apology, viewing a video on racism, or moving to a
different dorm. 230 It is true that low grades may lead to academic
probation or expulsion whereas a disciplinary proceeding may lead
to disciplinary probation or suspension, but why this distinction
should matter is not obvious. No court considering a university
23
code has regarded this distinction as relevant in any way. '
Perhaps the difference is that codes are policies set at too high
a level. But many of the routine regulations of speech are also set
at high levels: what will comprise the key components of the canon
for the common core (required for all undergraduates); what will
comprise the key components of the canon in various contexts; what
courses will be offered; whether there will be a women's studies
department; whether a department's recommendation on hiring or
promotion will be given effect or overruled. Many of these decisions
are made at a high level or even the highest level. Many are also
explicit written policies that judge speech by content. Yet none could
give rise to a constitutional claim by a student or member of the
faculty not able to read or engage in the speech they value.
Courts could, of course, adopt a rule that public university
regulation of speech must always be at the lowest possible level, to
foster free speech. Thus, the regulation of speech in one way by
one professor can be offset by the regulation of speech another way
by another professor. Under a micro-only approach, professors
(once hired? once tenured?) would be free to teach whatever they
wanted. There would be no canon nor higher-level decisions about
course offerings. Promotion and hiring decisions would be made at
the department level (assuming funds were available for the slot);
230. See, e.g., id. at 1167-68.
231. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); UWM Post,
Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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higher administrators or committees would not be able to review
these departmental decision and overrule them.
Such an approach would have advantages for women, minorities, and other newcomers to university communities (such as "out"
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men). They would, once hired, be free
to teach whatever they wanted unbound by traditional notions of
what their discipline is about and what students "need" to know.
Departmental hiring and promotion decisions are most likely to be
overruled by higher decisionmakers when scholars who look marginal are under consideration, and women, minorities, and other
newcomers (especially if interested in new issues and approaches)
are most likely to look marginal. A rule banning final hiring and
promotion decisions above the departmental level would, therefore,
also be good for women and other outsiders.
But these changes are simply unimaginable. They would not
seriously be considered for a moment. Our commitment to only
"micro" regulation of speech is not all that deep.
Perhaps speech codes are different because they regulate speech
outside classrooms as well as within them. But the learning experience, centered in the classroom, is the central concern of university
life. All else is ordered so as to create the appropriate learning
environment, and the core of that environment is the classroom
itself. If speech codes advance classroom learning, by minimizing
harassing speech which interferes with learning while contributing
little or nothing to an academic discussion, then such codes are
justified by the central mission of the university, the successful
transmission of learning, the same mission that justifies regulation
of speech within the classroom.
Moreover, unless the speech takes place in a non public arena,
such as someone's dorm room or a meeting room reserved by a
particular student group, 23 2 one person's free speech in a "public
forum"-for example, yelling racial or sexual epitaphs at persons
of a another race or sex-makes another person a "captive audience" to speech they find objectionable, hurtful, and incompatible
with an environment conducive to successful learning. The right to
free speech should not include the right to coerce others within a
university community to listen to such speech.
What seems different about the speech code cases is that those
codes protect new entrants to academic communities in nontraditional ways. Therefore the regulation in terms of content is visible
232. Widman v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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as such and seems unusual. Therefore the courts are willing to
consider constitutional challenges to content discrimination. Therefore the content discrimination seems inappropriateand inconsistent
with our idea of the university.
In fact, free speech arguments can be advanced on both sides
in the speech-code cases. One could regard public university faculty
as protected from judicial review by a notion of academic freedom
and university autonomy grounded in the free speech clause of the
first amendment. One could regard, as within the peculiar competence of these faculty, and beyond the competence of federal judges,
assessments of speech and speech codes themselves for academic
quality and educational value. Under this approach, concerns for
free speech would cut against judicial review, leaving academic
communities to define quality speech independent of federal judicial
oversight.
This approach has been taken in Title VII challenges to academic hiring and promotion decisions at public as well as private
universities. Although Title VII bans discrimination in employment
on the basis of sex and race, women and minorities who have
attempted to bring Title VII challenges to university evaluations of
the content of their speech have found the federal courts less, not
more, willing to review content-based university assessments of speech
than similar decisions by other employers. Indeed, some courtswithout any support in the language or legislative history of Title
VII-have refused to order an award of tenure in discriminatory
promotion cases, because that would be too great an interference
with university autonomy and academic decisionmaking!2 3 Plaintiffs
before such courts are limited, regardless of the strength of the
showing of discrimination, to reinstatement pending "good faith"
reconsideration of the tenure decision. 2
What is the difference between the speech code cases and these
cases? Why do federal judges feel competent to second-guess university officials in one situation and not the other? Why do speech
concerns argue for striking speech codes rather than for leaving
universities free to assess quality of racist and sexist speech just as
they are free to assess quality of other speech, even when their
assessments may violate Title VII? Again, courts seem unwilling to
review speech assessments that exclude new entrants in light of
233. See, e.g., Guzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988).
234. This set of cases provides another illustration of how women are likely to be better
off before legislative bodies. It is good that these strange interpretations of Title VII can be
corrected by Congress. Women could only be worse off were these holdings constitutional.
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traditional understandings of quality but are willing to review assessments of quality of speech in speech codes that protect new
entrants in nontraditionalways.
There are, of course, good reasons why federal courts might
be reluctant to get embroiled in every assessment of the content of
speech by a public university. Imagine that every grade or professor's
response in class or elsewhere to the content of speech is regarded
as potentially a violation of the Constitution and freely reviewable.
How could the judge grade or assess scholarship for tenure purposes
without reference to content? What would the judge look at?
Neither the federal courts nor public universities could survive
in any recognizable form were federal courts actually to ban content
or viewpoint discrimination in all assessments of speech. But if
federal courts do not review grades, syllabi, tenure decisions, decisions not to have a women's studies department, not to offer courses
in feminism, etc. they should not review speech codes. All these
assessments involve considerations of academic quality and should
either be beyond or within the competency of the federal judiciary.
Any other result will be, not neutrality, but judicial protection for
traditions that often disadvantage and discriminate against women
and racial minorities while denying similar deference to contentbased decisions that protect women and other newcomers to aca235
demic communities.
Moreover, many of the objections to judicial review of routine
university assessments of speech are principled, not simply pragmatic. One simply cannot assess quality of speech independent of
content and viewpoint, as becomes clear when one considers speech
at the margins of the evaluator's notion of acceptable academic
speech in a particular setting. Evaluating speech in terms of quality
is the central mission of the university and it is a worthwhile one.
We should not abandon this effort, though we must all strive to
hear and appreciate as much as possible the viewpoints of others
and question our own. Universities should continue to assess the
quality of speech, including speech covered by speech codes and
other speech, even though such assessments inevitably turn on content and viewpoint.
Speech codes allow university communities to define themselves
in particular ways. 236 It seems likely that not all kinds of speech can
235. Under this approach, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university
must afford meeting space to religious student organization when such space made available
to other student groups), would be seen as a public forum case, not a university-speech case.
236. Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay
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be simultaneously maximized in any particular community. A community extremely tolerant of extremely conservative speech is likely
to silence radical and even liberal speech in subtle and not-so-subtle
ways. And vice versa. For example, I have heard women in graduate
school complain that they feel less able to articulate their concerns
in an institution more open to conservative viewpoints than their
undergraduate institutions. And I have heard conservatives complain
that liberal institutions similarly silence them.
It may be a good thing that universities, even public universities,
can differ from each other (on a university-wide basis), thus offering
prospective students a variety of communities with identities and
real differences. There may also likely to be a synergistic effect to
having certain universities with certain university-wide slants, thus
bringing together like-minded faculty who can work together on
similar projects and for common goals. Students are not forced to
go to any particular university and universities are today extremely
competitive.237
There would of course be disadvantages to such an approach,
and I am not actually advocating specialized universities. My point
is that a case may be made for such universities, and there might
even be more varied speech in a world with such universities; why
should the question be resolved, for public universities, by the nine
justices on the Supreme Court, rather than by ordinary democratic
processes?
Private universities are of course completely free to define
themselves in specialized ways and routinely do so. 23 Public universities are disciplined by their very nature as public universities in
ways that make hypothetical and objectionable explicit bans on
whole categories of valuable academic speech-such as feminist
speech or economic analysis or speech by Marxist professors-most
unlikely today regardless of any judicial review. And, in any event,
there is no reason to consider federal judges more trustworthy than
the political processes that produce and operate public universities.
Covertly, universities often discriminate today on these bases without
any judicial review.
for the ACLU, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv., 349, 356-59 (1992) (making point in context
of private universities).
237. David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era (draft of a paper for
AALS Constitutional Law Panel, 1993) (on file with author).
238. Consider, for example, the many private religious schools, schools specializing in
science or technology, and schools with an informal but discernible bent for market-based
approaches (such as the University of Chicago).
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Part of the point, of course, is that in the event of error, and
error may certainly occur, participants in political processes are
capable of learning and correcting their errors, and are more likely
to do so if not "saved" the trouble by binding judicial review.
Members of political bodies and ordinary citizens might in the end
be more responsible and tolerant if allowed to correct their own
mistakes. As Henry Steele Commager noted in the forties: "Is it
not reasonable to suppose that majorities, like individuals, learn by
their mistakes, and that only the lessons learned by experience make
a lasting impression."' 39 If only judges learn tolerance, tolerance
will remain elusive, since judges can do but little to enforce tolerance
throughout society or even universities. This point is especially
important because, as noted earlier, previous eras of unusual intolerance have ended as a result of political, not judicial, action.m
Federal judicial review of university regulation of speech provides a concrete illustration of many of the objections I raised
earlier to judicial review. It is countermajoritarian in two senses:
(1) it is inconsistent with a policy desired by a large number of
people (presumably a majority) acting through nonjudicial governmental institutions; and (2) it frustrates women's efforts to attain
equality throughout society, including the political arena, thus preserving the political dominance of a minority group (white men).
Sexist language and harassment make it harder for women to succeed
in academic life, and such successes (and the internal confidence
success in an environment that is not harassing can give) are important credentials for a successful political life.
The case of binding judicial review of university speech codes
illustrates a number of my more concrete points. First, it seems to
do a good job of protecting the class, race, and sex interests of
those who do the reviewing. As Brest has noted, binding judicial
review in speech cases rather clearly reflects the interests of the
"reasoning class" more than the interests of the population as a
whole, and this is true in the university cases as well one suspects.2
More particularly, with respect to sex, binding judicial review of
university content-based regulation of speech protects the interests
of those who harass women and minorities, thus serving the interests
of the dominant white male class. This is so, though many other
university decisions assess speech in terms of content, often harming
women and minorities thereby. But these assessments are not subject
239. COMMAGER, supra note 2, at 72.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
241. Brest, supra note 3.
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to any binding constitutional review and receive only the most
limited review even under Title VII.
Second, binding judicial review of public university regulation
of speech precludes valuable experimentation. It seems quite likely
that some experimentation with various approaches is needed. No
one (and no nine) deciding a single case is (or are) likely to come
to the ideal solution of how to maximize quality speech for all in
every public university community.
Third, binding judicial review in this area has impoverished
political speech and democratic deliberations by removing important
issues from consideration and focusing attention on constitutional
doctrine, which is unusually incoherent and unrealistic here, with
the insistence, in the lower courts do date, that public universities
not regulate speech in terms of content and viewpoint (though in
point of fact, they do it continuously). We need to discuss and
consider, as a polity, the serious questions raised by university speech
codes: how best to balance the needs of all members of university
communities.
The university cases also suggest the futility of looking to the
courts for effective enforcement of a desired social outcome. Most
university regulation of speech is entirely invisible to the courts.
Indeed, even when asked by Title VII litigants to review regulations
likely to be discriminating against women and minorities, the courts
have fairly successfully declined the invitation.
University speech regulation also suggests that the major justifications for judicial review in the face of the countermajoritarian
difficulty are hollow. The first major justification is that courts
have more leisure, insulation, ability to make principled decisions
than do a majority of the polity. Again, this point rings hollow in
the context of judicial review of university content-based speech
assessments. Courts see the first amendment as insulating from any
judicial review university assessments in selection of courses, syllabi,
grading of exams, papers, selection of dissertation topics, promotion
and tenure, though these assessments often hurt women and minorities because of their tendency to use traditional understandings
of what is valuable in academic speech. Courts see the first amendment as supporting judicial review of university content-based speech
assessments only when those assessments take the form of explicit
codes protecting new entrants, women and minorities, from unspoken understandings of tolerable behavior within these communities.
This combination of decisions suggests that judges. are no more
likely than other mortals to make decisions free of class, race, and
sex bias.
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The second set of justifications views binding judicial review
as fostering democracy in some sense, either by promoting the
inclusion of marginal groups or by holding to "We the people's"
understanding at a constitutional moment . But judicial review does
neither of these things in the context of university regulation of
speech. Binding judicial review of university content-based assessments of speech only when the assessments protect women and
racial minorities does not promote, in any way, real democracy.
Harassment and verbal abuse is part of the system keeping these
groups, a majority of the population, in second-class status. Binding
judicial review of this nature is more likely to retard democracy.
At no constitutional moment, even in Ackerman's schema, even
if we ignore the exclusion of women and minorities, did "We, the
people" in any sense approve of the exceedingly intrusive judicial
review we see in speech cases today, including binding review even
of regulations by states or local entities (not mentioned at all in the
first amendment) such as public (state, not federal) universities. This
sweeping review of state and local regulation of speech developed
only after the last constitutional moment. 242
Furthermore, tolerance of sexist and racist speech are likely to
be inconsistent with increasing inclusion of women and racial minorities in university communities; tolerance of sexual and racial
harassment and abuse may well lead to escalating harassment and
abuse, rather than to a more tolerant society. As other commentators
have pointed out, tolerance of racist speech has often coexistedas during the McCarthy era-with high levels of suppression of
political speech. 243 Tolerance of racist Nazi speech in Weimar Germany led to escalating racism and holocaust, not tolerance. We do
not yet know what sorts of policies are most likely to lead to real
inclusion of women and minorities in university communities.
The university speech cases provide a striking illustration of the
tendency of binding federal judicial review of speech claims to
support the status quo. Universities routinely regulate speech for
content and viewpoint in countless ways; that is their purpose and
they would otherwise be no more valuable than empty lots with
soap boxes. Yet only when university regulation of speech protects
new entrants do judges see that universities regulate speech. To only
see regulation in such codes is to protect the status quo and traditional norms.
242. See supra text accompanying note 194.
243. See Nagel, supra note 57; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 27.
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Analysis of the countermajoritarian difficulty and of the justifications for judicial review tend to take place at a high level of
abstraction. When they are considered in the context of the specific
issue of university speech, the case for judicial review becomes quite
tenuous and the ambiguities (maybe it helps, maybe it hurts) disappear.
A careful analysis of judicial review of public university regulation speech suggests an additional problem with the evolving ban
on viewpoint discrimination by government. Mere mortals cannot
actually see viewpoint discrimination whenever it occurs; what looks
like reality will not seem a matter of viewpoint. What looks new
and different is likely to stand out against background expectations
and understandings and look like viewpoint. A ban on viewpoint
regulation is, therefore, likely to be extremely conservative when
enforced by federal judges.
CONCLUSION

Women are a majority group who were excluded from the
country's founding. Women had no hand in shaping the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or binding judicial review. In this article,
I have argued that such review cannot be legitimate if, in fact, it
contributes to women's continuing subordinate status, despite their
presence as a majority group. I have considered binding judicial
review in three general areas: free speech, sex equality, and abortion.
Although any judgment is necessarily speculative in assessing these
complex issues, I have suggested that, with the possible exception
of abortion (which is too close to call), it is likely that binding
judicial review in these areas has hurt women.
I have identified four major problems with binding judicial
review from the perspective of women. First, judicial bias is a major
problem given the overwhelmingly male makeup of the judiciary.
Second, binding judicial review precludes needed experimentation,
necessary if we are to be able even to discover what equality between
the sexes might mean or what sorts of legal rules might foster it
either in equality cases or speech cases.
Third, binding judicial review interferes with quality democratic
deliberations in a number of ways. It can legitimate the status quo
without requiring much real change, keep important issues off the
agenda of ordinary politics, and interfere with political movements,
by lowering the pressure for change enough to make long-term
significant change unlikely.
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Fourth, and last, there is the problem of futility, including
perverse adaptation: the courts are not institutionally capable of
producing real social change, such as equality between the sexes,
though they are capable of taking the steam out of a political
movement for change by granting trivial victories. Looked at with
a critical eye, even the "good" cases-the sex equality and abortion
cases-seem of questionable utility to women. And analysis of the
speech code cases reveal more specific problems with binding judicial
review. Judges cannot see viewpoint discrimination when women
and minorities are excluded from, or silenced in, university communities in traditional ways, though they have no difficulty seeing
viewpoint discrimination in new speech codes protecting women,
minorities, and other newcomers to university communities.
The speech code cases suggest that binding judicial review is a
problem for racial minorities as well as for women. This reinforces
the suspicions voiced in the introduction. Perhaps, in general, binding judicial review does not protect racial minorities from the
tyranny of the majority very well. And even if judicial review for
race discrimination is a net plus for racial minorities considered
alone, binding judicial review may be a negative when the costs to
minorities of being unable to regulate racist speech are balanced
against it. The case for judicial review of free speech and equal
protection is, taking both together, tenuous at best, though to be
sure, we could have different levels of review for race distinctions
and speech.
With sex, the case is, I believe, even more tenuous. We certainly
do not know what a world with sex equality would look like nor
do we know how to get there. The decisions to date dealing with
sex discrimination are quite mixed: a number of trivial wins for
women, an even larger number of wins for men, and some important
losses: both cases in which rules women need in our imperfect world
were struck and cases in which the Court allowed serious discrimination to stand. Yet, by purporting to eliminate sex discrimination,
the Court weakened women's incentive to get involved themselves
in politics from the grass up, thus lessening the chance that women
themselves would be able to protect their own interests through the
use of their majority political status.
Abortion-judicial review in the context of a fundamental rightmight seem to be women's most unambiguous win, but even that
assessment may be optimistic. Roe v. Wade also deflected women's
attention form their own political involvement and encouraged them
to rely instead on the federal judiciary for protection. And the
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narrow reliance on the judiciary's assurance of abortion rights
weakened the political coalition women could have formed across
race and class to push legislatively an agenda that would give all
women adequate supports and health care in order to have desired
children as well as the ability not to have unwanted children.
Moreover, the combination of Roe v. Wade and subsequent, more
conservative, decisions limiting the right to abortion for poor and
teenage women produced a situation in the women with the most
political clout had the least incentive to try to change the system
and fractured women's coalition across age and wealth.
Perhaps judicial review is harmful to women (or minorities)
only in one or some areas I have considered and not other areas,
particularly areas I have ignored. If so, then we should seriously
consider the legitimacy of continued judicial review in the troubling
areas, independent of whether judicial review in other areas is good
for women (or minorities). We do not, after all, have the same kind
of judicial review for all constitutional provisions. 2" If, for example,
judicial review of restrictions on speech tend to hurt women and
racial minorities by supporting the power of a minority group (white
men), then-regardless of the legitimacy of judicial review in other
contexts-judicial review in speech cases would be illegitimate.
Genuine democracy is not likely to occur by accident. Perhaps,
like those radical democrats the Athenians, we should regard as
essential to democracy the elimination of hubris, which originally
meant dishonoring and shaming the victim for one's own pleasure
and gratification. 245 Such actions, whether through speech or conduct, are inconsistent with democracy. Thus, university speech
codes-and other regulations of racist and sexist speech-might be
necessary prerequisites for a working democracy and for a marketplace in which all are able to speak.
As this suggests, the legitimacy problem can, I think, be turned
into an argument for certain substantive outcomes, for some interpretations of the free speech and equality provisions rather than
others. Judges should defer to sex-based legislative classifications
that protect women fulfilling traditional roles. It is true that protection inevitably reinforces traditional stereotypes. But given the
ubiquitous problem of judicial bias, experimentation with such ap-

244. Calabresi, supra note 1.
AND SocIET 178 (1991); see also Robin West,
245. See DAVID COHEN, LAW, SEAxuAL,
Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PIrr. L. REv.
673 (1985); West, supra note 91.
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proaches may be necessary if we are ever to see equality between
the sexes.
In university settings, judges should be hesitant about extending
judicial review into a new area like university speech in light of the
conservative and skewed nature of their review. And judges should
be more tolerant of viewpoint-restrictions which help groups who
have less than their share of political power, particularly when those
groups were excluded from the Constitution-making process. In
contrast, judges should be most tolerant of viewpoint restrictions
which limit the speech of groups with more than their share of
political power, particularly when such groups dominated the Constitution-making process.
Differentiating between groups in this sort of way will feel odd,
uncomfortable, even illegitimate to federal judges. But unless such
distinctions are made, any formal guarantee, such as contemporary
free speech, will end up conservative and hence anti-democratic.
Binding judicial review of any such constitutional right, resulting in
this sort of conservative slant, is illegitimate, I have argued, from
the perspective of women: a majority group who had no part in
shaping the system of binding judicial review and too little part
shaping any right. We seem to have only three choices: (1) learning
to make distinctions based on a history of exclusion and contemporary differentials in power; (2) living under a profoundly illegitimate system; or (3) abandoning binding judicial review for sexbased classifications and speech. I prefer the last of these alternatives. From the perspective of women, it would be best to eliminate
entirely binding judicial review in speech and sex-equality cases. But
if that option is unavailable, then we must choose between illegitimacy and beginning to learn to draw difficult distinctions in terms
of power.

